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INTRODUCTION
The United States is in the midst of a historic health care crisis. A
variety of factors such as growing health administrative costs,
increased proliferation of medical technology, increased demand for
medical services, and growing costs borne by third-party payors have
raised the cost of medical care in the United States to record levels.'
Such costs are increasing faster than the rate of inflation and
consuming a greater percentage of American families' incomes.2
Compounding this problem, roughly 46.3 million Americans lacked
health insurance coverage in 2008.3 Although Congress enacted
historic legislation in March 2010 designed to improve the American
health insurance system radically,4 critics of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act ("PPACA") continue to lambast its
potential to improve health care for American patients.' In any case,
the PPACA's fundamental insurance reforms will not take effect until
2013 or later,6 and its benefits will likely take even longer to
1. Growth in Health Care Costs: Before the S. Comm. on the Budget, 110th Cong. 4-7
(2008) (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Cong. Budget Office), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8948/01-31-HealthTestimony.pdf; Steffie Woolhandler
et al., Costs of Health Care Administration in the United States and Canada, 349 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 768, 768 (2003).
2. Paul H. Keckley, Forward to DELOITTE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS,
MEDICAL TOURISM: CONSUMERS IN SEARCH OF VALUE 2 (2008),
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/uschs
.MedicalTourismStudy(3).pdf.
3. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY,
AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2008, at 20 (2009),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-236.pdf.
4. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).
5. See, e.g., Jason Arvak, Health Reform Critics Were Right, MODERATE VOICE
(May 18, 2010), http://themoderatevoice.com/73055/health-care-reform-critics-were-right/;
Newt Gingrich, Healthcare Rationing: Real Scary, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2009),
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/16/opinion/oe-gingrichl6; David Whelan, Why
Obamacare Will Raise Your Bill, FORBES.COM (Jan. 1, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/
01/16/obamacare-health-reform-lifestyle-health-health-care-insurance-premiums.html.
Others argue that the law's provisions do not go far enough to create meaningful reform.
See Mike Lillis, Poll: Many Voters Think Healthcare Reform Didn't Go Far Enough, THE
HILL (Sept. 25, 2010), http://thehill.comlblogs/blog-briefing-room/news/120915-poll-many-
voters-think-health-reform-too-conservative.
6. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148
(providing statutory authority for these reforms and setting the timeline for
implementation of each part); Focus on Health Reform: Health Reform Implementation
Timeline, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (June 15, 2010), http://www.kff.org/
healthreform/upload/8060.pdf (providing a detailed timeline of implementation for the
Act). For example, the bill's CO-OP program, which establishes member-run, nonprofit
insurance programs, will be implemented in mid-2013. Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act § 1322; Focus on Health Reform, supra, at 6. Various insurance administration
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materialize. In the face of sweeping and uncertain changes to
Americans' primary mode of health care financing, the future of
American health care is fraught with uncertainty.
In the midst of this health care crisis, American patients are
increasingly turning to a novel source of health care: developing
countries. Disenchanted with American providers or simply unable to
afford the domestic care they would prefer, millions of American
patients have engaged in medical tourism, traveling abroad-often to
developing countries such as Thailand, Brazil, and India-for the
purpose of receiving medical care.' Though travel for medical
purposes is an ancient concept, medical tourism quickly is becoming
a popular phenomenon among Americans; the practice has
experienced burgeoning publicity within the last decade.' A 2008
study conducted by the Deloitte Center for Health Solutions
estimated that 750,000 Americans engaged in medical tourism in 2007
and anticipated that as many as six million would engage in the
practice by 2010.0 Although until recently Americans desiring cost-
regulations will be phased in gradually between 2013 and 2016. Focus on Health Reform,
supra, at 6. Similarly, the primary changes to employer and individual insurance plans and
the creation of state-based exchanges will not take effect until 2014. Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1204,124 Stat. 1029, 1055-56
(to be codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); Focus on Health Reform,
supra, at 6.
7. See, e.g., JOSEF WOODMAN, PATIENTS BEYOND BORDERS: EVERYBODY'S
GUIDE TO AFFORDABLE, WORLD-CLASS MEDICAL TOURISM 5 (2007); Nicholas P.
Terry, Under-Regulated Healthcare Phenomena in a Flat World: Medical Tourism and
Outsourcing, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 421, 422-23 (2007); Michael D. Horowitz et al.,
Medical Tourism: Globalization of the Healthcare Marketplace, MEDSCAPE GEN. MED.
(Nov. 13, 2007), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles[PMC2234298/. This practice is
distinguished from the experience of tourists who are forced inadvertently to receive
medical care while traveling overseas. See MILICIA Z. BOOKMAN & KARLA R.
BOOKMAN, MEDICAL TOURISM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 45-46 (2007); Terry, supra,
at 423. The experience of these tourists is likely to be vastly different from that of
purposeful medical tourists, particularly if they are unable to arrange care at facilities
targeting medical tourists.
8. See, e.g., Michael Klaus, Note, Outsourcing Vital Operations: What if U.S. Health
Care Costs Drive Patients Overseas for Surgery?, 9 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 219, 221-22
(2006) (describing medical tourism practices of ancient Greeks and Romans).
9. See Horowitz et al., supra note 7 ("Medical tourism has captured the interest of
the media."). A search of news articles shows a sudden appearance of reporting on
medical tourism in 2004; scholarly publications turned their attention to medical tourism
as early as 2006. See, e.g., Klaus, supra note 8; Frederik Balfour & Manjeet Kripalani,
Sand, Sun and Surgery, BUS. WK., Feb. 16, 2004, at 48,48; Medical Tourism: Need Surgery,
Will Travel, CBC NEWS (June 18, 2004), http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/healthcare/
medicaltourism.html.
10. DELOITTE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, supra note 2, at 3. Due to the
unexpected economic downturn and a resulting decrease in Americans' spending on even
necessary medical care, the Deloitte Center for Health Solutions recently revised its
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savings on elective procedures, such as cosmetic surgery, constituted
the main demographic of medical tourists," the practice has
increasingly spread to patients requiring vital surgery, such as
cardiovascular and orthopedic care, 2  and even organ
transplantation." Several countries have even begun to cultivate a
medical tourism market by actively promoting American patients'
travel to hospitals designated specifically for medical tourists. 14
Bumrungrad International Hospital in Bangkok, Thailand, for
instance, offers a 554-bed hospital facility which prides itself on
"world class healthcare," "experienced American management," and
"widely spoken" English."
Since receiving increased publicity over the past several years,
medical tourism has been both lauded for its substantial cost benefits
to patients and widely criticized, from academic circlesl6 to the halls
estimate to 1.6 million individuals in 2012. DELOITTE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS,
MEDICAL TOURISM: UPDATE AND IMPLICATIONS 3, 9 (2009), http://www.deloitte.com/
assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/us_chs MedicalTourism_111209
web.pdf. This more conservative report estimates medical tourism will grow, despite the
recession, at approximately thirty-five percent per year. Id. at 9. Other analysts' estimates
of medical tourism incidence vary substantially. See, e.g., Ian Youngman, Medical Tourism
Statistics: Why McKinsey Has Got It Wrong, INT'L MED. TRAVEL J., http://www.imtjonline
.com/articles/2009/mckinsey-wrong-medical-travel/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2011) (describing
competing estimates of the annual number of medical tourists from all countries at 60,000
to 85,000 medical tourists, to five to six million medical tourists).
11. See Allison Van Dusen, Outsourcing Your Health, FORBES.COM (May 22, 2007),
http://www.forbes.com/2007/05/21/outsourcing-medical-tourism-biz-cx-avd_0522med
tourism.html.
12. DELOITTE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, supra note 2, at 7.
13. Angelique Parsiyar, Comment, Medical Tourism: The Commodification of Health
Care in Latin America, 15 L. & BUS. REV. AMERICAS 379, 381 (2009).
14. See, e.g., WOODMAN, supra note 7, at 8; Terry, supra note 7, at 425 (describing the
aspirations and efforts of the Indian government to become a "global health destination");
Klaus, supra note 8, at 222-24 (describing the developing medical tourism sector of
Thailand and India); see also Nathan Cortez, Patients Without Borders: The Emerging
Global Market for Patients and the Evolution of Modern Health Care, 83 IND. L.J. 71, 85-
89 (2008) (providing details of the active privatization and globalization efforts of
countries such as India, Nepal, Indonesia, Thailand, and Sri Lanka, including targeted
advertising of English-speaking patients).
15. BUMRUNGRAD INT'L HOSP., http://www.bumrungrad.com (last visited Jan. 3,
2011); Mission/Guiding Principles, BUMRUNGRAD INT'L HOSP., http://www.bumrungrad
.com/overseas-medical-care/about-us/missions.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2011); Overview,
BUMRUNGRAD INT'L HOSP., http://www.bumrungrad.com/overseas-medical-care/about-
us/overview.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2011).
16. See, e.g., Christopher J. Brady, Note, Offshore Gambling: Medical Outsourcing
Versus ERISA's Fiduciary Duty Requirement, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1073, 1076 (2007)
(arguing that inclusion of medical tourism options in employee health insurance plans
would constitute a violation of ERISA's fiduciary duty requirement); Philip Mirrer-Singer,
Note, Medical Malpractice Overseas: The Legal Uncertainty Surrounding Medical Tourism,
70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211, 212 (2007) (arguing that medical tourism is dangerous
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of Congress." Critics warn that medical tourists have traded vital
protections inherent in the American health care system for mere cost
savings.'" Several scholarly articles have advocated tolerance of
medical tourism only if highly regulated by government agencies. 9
While such arguments have merit, this Comment argues that they
often overlook the injurious effects of regulation on the medical
tourism market and overemphasize the need for a paternalistic
approach to patients.
This Comment agrees with others20 in recognizing medical
tourism as a trade-off for consumers, allowing patients to opt out of
increased regulation in favor of looser restrictions and greater cost
savings. Factors unique to the medical tourism industry will help
preserve the quality of patient care and insulate patients from the
regulatory pitfalls21 that critics of medical tourism most fear. This
Comment will argue that, despite these regulatory pitfalls, medical
tourism is a net positive practice which should be embraced and
integrated into the American health care system. Both quality of care
and patient autonomy are best preserved by a regulatory system that
relies upon market forces without interference from significant
regulatory strictures, but which also mandates increased transparency
for patient-consumers to make fully informed health care choices.
Ultimately, broad integration of medical tourism into the U.S. health
care system is favorable, despite its inherent regulatory conflicts.
Indeed, resolution of these conflicts is feasible and likely will effect
positive changes in the American health care system.
to patients who face significant hurdles to achieving recourse for medical malpractice
overseas).
17. See generally The Globalization of Health Care: Can Medical Tourism Reduce
Health Care Costs?: Hearing Before the Spec. Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. (2006)
[hereinafter Medical Tourism Hearing], available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_senate hearings&docid=f:30618.pdf (providing Senate
testimony of medical tourists and health care professionals both for and against medical
tourism).
18. See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 14, at 71 ("[P]atients are waiving the rights, benefits,
and protections offered by our health care regulatory system to seek medical care in
countries that may not grant them remotely similar rights or protections.").
19. See, e.g., id. at 114-32; Brady, supra note 16, at 1112-13. But see Terry, supra note
7, at 470 ("[Medical o]utsourcing is essentially unregulated and is likely to remain that
way."). These and other specific proposals are discussed in greater detail infra Part II.B.
20. See Cortez, supra note 14, at 95-113; Brady, supra note 16, at 1102; Parsiyar, supra
note 13, at 393.
21. The term "regulatory pitfalls" is used throughout this Comment to refer to facets
of health care regulation which are potentially troublesome in the medical tourism
context.
2011] 611
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Part I of this Comment addresses the basic trade-off which
medical tourism represents. It describes the substantial benefits
medical tourism provides to American patients, including substantial
cost savings, improved patient autonomy, a luxury experience, and
positive changes to the health care system as a whole. At the same
time, it recognizes potential risks to medical consumers, including
uncertain quality of care, reduced access to legal remedies, and
conflicts with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA"), 2 but it notes that these concerns are largely exaggerated
or misplaced. It concludes that these factors create an overall
favorable balance for medical tourists which justifies the continued
growth of medical tourism. Part II details the current health care
regulatory system in the United States, including both governmental
and non-governmental methods. It describes various proposals that
have been suggested for medical tourism, as well as the health care
industry's self-regulatory means. It concludes that both the current
regulatory structure and proposals intended to address the
burgeoning medical tourism market provide an ineffective remedy for
the flawed American health care system. Finally, Part III advocates
for a modified market-based approach to medical tourism. Because
market forces operate uniquely on the medical tourism industry to
ensure quality and affordable prices, these forces should be allowed
to regulate the medical tourism industry. To enable market forces to
operate more effectively, however, the federal government should
increase transparency by mandating disclosure of data which are
collected by its accrediting organizations. The data-regarding
operations and outcomes in medical tourism facilities-should be
available to the American public in an accessible, synthesized format.
In this way, the benefits of medical tourism can be preserved as
American patients continue to engage in the practice.
22. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(2006). ERISA is a federal law which places minimum standards on the management and
administration of employee benefit plans, including health insurance plans. See id. §1001;
Brady, supra note 16, at 1076-77.
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I. THE TOURIST'S TRADE-OFF: BALANCING BENEFITS AND
BURDENS OF MEDICAL TOURISM
A. Benefits of Medical Tourism
1. Cost Savings
First and foremost, American medical tourists are persuaded to
make their unconventional choice to travel thousands of miles for
medical care because medical tourism provides them with substantial
cost savings.23 Treatments are significantly cheaper in medical tourism
destinations than in the United States.24 This is due to the lower costs
of labor in developing countries,2 5 coupled with inflated health care
costs in the United States as a result of such factors as increased
demand for medical services and medical technology, high
administrative costs and costs third-party payors bear, and-
arguably-medical malpractice costs and inefficient patient
processing.26 A recent survey suggests that medical tourists can save
up to ninety percent on out-of-pocket expenses for fifteen common
surgeries, even taking into account the cost of travel.27 Treatments in
India are estimated to cost on average ten to twenty percent of the
price of the same surgeries in the United States;28 treatments in
Mexico, Malaysia, and Thailand cost one-quarter to one-third the
price of the same procedures in the United States.29 These cost
savings are observed for virtually all types of procedures, including
complex procedures such as bone marrow transplants3 0 and mitral
valve surgery,"1 which would cost uninsured patients hundreds of
thousands of dollars in the United States. Medical tourism's cost
23. E.g., Kerrie S. Howze, Note, Medical Tourism: Symptom or Cure?, 41 GA. L. REV.
1013, 1017 (2007) (stating that the medical tourism market among American patients is
driven by cost).
24. E.g., Brady, supra note 16, at 1094-95 (explaining the reasons for high health care
costs in the United States as opposed to Asia); Klaus, supra note 8, at 229 (describing the
cost disparities between the United States and Asia).
25. BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 96-97.
26. Growth in Health Care Costs: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Budget, supra
note 1, at 4-7; Woolhandler et al., supra note 1, at 768; see Howze, supra note 23, at 1017-
18; Klaus, supra note 8, at 229-33.
27. DELOiTrE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, supra note 2, at 13.
28. Klaus, supra note 8, at 224; DELOITTE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, supra note
2, at 6.
29. DELOITrE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, supra note 2, at 6.
30. Klaus, supra note 8, at 224.
31. See Medical Tourism Hearing, supra note 17, at 2-4 (statement of Maggi Ann
Grace, patient advocate).
2011]1 613
614 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89
savings may provide some patients with extra incentive to undergo a
desired elective procedure.32 For patients who lack the financial
means and health insurance coverage to pay for necessary surgeries,
however, medical tourism can prevent personal bankruptcy and
literally save a patient's life.33
Though all patients can benefit from saving money on medical
care, medical tourism's cost savings are more likely to benefit those
populations most vulnerable to inadequate health insurance coverage.
Current medical tourists tend to be of average financial means.34
Wealthy Americans are more likely to be covered adequately by
health insurance plans" or are more capable of paying for medical
care out-of-pocket. Low-income individuals are more likely to be
covered by state-sponsored plans such as Medicaid36 or are unable to
pay even cut-rate fees for treatment abroad. Thus, it is typically
lower-middle-class individuals with sufficient means to pay for
reduced-price care out-of-pocket who are able to benefit most from
medical tourism.
In particular, medical tourism disproportionately benefits
uninsured or underinsured individuals." Individuals whose insurance
32. Howze, supra note 23, at 1027-28; Klaus, supra note 8, at 240-41.
33. See Thomas R. McLean, The Global Market for Health Care: Economics and
Regulation, 26 Wis. INT'L L.J. 591, 594 (2009); Parsiyar, supra note 13, at 387.
34. Arnold Milstein & Mark Smith, America's New Refugees - Seeking Affordable
Surgery Offshore, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1637, 1637 (2006) (describing medical tourists as
"middle-income Americans").
35. See DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 3, at 25 (describing the inverse trend
between household income and percentage of households uninsured).
36. Medicaid is available for low-income individuals who also fall into one or more
"eligibility groups," such as pregnant women, children and their parents or legal
guardians, and the blind. See Medicaid Eligibility: Are You Eligible?, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/medicaideligibility/02_areyou
eligible_.asp?#TopOfPage (last modified Dec. 14, 2005). Authority to determine eligibility
requirements for Medicaid funds rests with the states. Id. By 2019, the PPACA is expected
to expand Medicaid coverage to all individuals younger than sixty-five whose adjusted
gross incomes are at or below 133% of the federal poverty level. Focus on Health Reform:
Summary of Coverage Provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.kff.org/healthreform/
upload/8023-R.pdf.
37. See Milstein & Smith, supra note 34, at 1637-39; Howze, supra note 23, at 1017-
18.
38. E.g., Parsiyar, supra note 13, at 387 (suggesting that medical tourism could be the
only means for uninsured and underinsured Americans to receive life-saving treatments);
Horowitz et al., supra note 7 (stating that Americans participating in medical tourism are
likely to have no health insurance or inadequate insurance). This trend is likely to
continue despite the enactment of the PPACA. See infra notes 54-60 and accompanying
text. However, the likely expansion of medical tourism into the health insurance market,
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covers all or most of their cost of care in the United States are far
more likely to take advantage of their present insurance coverage
than to incur additional expenses in traveling overseas. To date, few
private insurance companies allow individuals to choose care abroad
over domestic care, even though insurance companies could reap the
significant cost savings of individual medical tourists while reducing
the cost of their premiums for medical tourism plans.39 In fact, the
World Bank identified non-portability of health insurance as one of
the major obstacles to medical tourism's continued expansion.40
Individual patients are not the only ones benefitting from
medical tourism's impressive cost savings. The opportunity for
medical tourism is expanding as self-insured employers and private
insurance companies have begun integrating medical tourism into
their policies.41 Presently, medical tourism-based insurance appears
particularly attractive to small businesses, for which rising costs of
insuring employees has, in many cases, become prohibitively
expensive. 42 For example, Blue Ridge Paper Products, Inc., a self-
insured manufacturing company, attempted to implement a pilot
program in 2006 allowing employees to receive care overseas on a
voluntary basis.43 In exchange for participation, employees would
receive a portion of the company's savings." Before Blue Ridge was
able to implement this plan, however, the United Steelworker's
Union publically condemned the proposal and threatened to sue for
an injunction, citing concerns regarding quality of care, malpractice
liability, and long-term cost management plans, whereby employers
would force insured employees to receive health care overseas.4 5 In
see infra notes 41-53 and accompanying text, may change the traditional medical tourist
profile substantially as insured individuals are drawn increasingly into the practice.
39. Aaditya Mattoo & Randeep Rathindran, How Health Insurance Inhibits Trade in
Health Care, 25 HEALTH AFF. 358, 360 (2006).
40. BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 151; see also Mattoo & Rathindran,
supra note 39, at 358-59 (recognizing the non-portability of health insurance as an
impediment to trade in medical tourism services and recommending changes to current
health insurance plans which would better facilitate medical tourism).
41. See Kristen Boyle, Note, A Permanent Vacation: Evaluating Medical Tourism's
Place in the United States Healthcare System, HEALTH LAW., June 2008, at 42, 43; Howze,
supra note 23, at 1019-22.
42. Boyle, supra note 41, at 43; Brady, supra note 16, at 1103.
43. McLean, supra note 33, at 600; Brady, supra note 16, at 1103.
44. McLean, supra note 33, at 600; Brady, supra note 16, at 1103.
45. Saritha Rai, Union Disrupts Plan to Send Ailing Workers to India for Cheaper
Medical Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006, at C6, available at http://www.nytimes.coml
2006/10/11/business/worldbusiness/1health.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1. Quality of care
and medical malpractice concerns are considered infra Parts I.B.1 and I.B.2, respectively.
2011] 615
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the face of negative media coverage,4 6 Blue Ridge removed all union
workers from pilot program eligibility.47 Since the Blue Ridge
debacle, however, other companies have begun implementing similar
plans.48
Large-scale insurers are beginning to take advantage of medical
tourism as well. Several large HMOs and health insurance companies
have already established plans allowing patients to take advantage of
low-cost options overseas, while others are seriously considering the
idea.49 The enactment of the PPACA-and, in particular, its mandate
that all businesses provide insurance for their employees or face
finesso-may prompt an increasing number of small businesses to
provide insurance plans offering medical tourism options and to
promote medical tourism among their employees, as they attempt to
reduce the costs associated with providing those plans."' Some critics
have expressed concern that insurance companies will take advantage
Employer responses to medical tourism and potential conflicts of interests regarding plan
administrator fiduciary duties under ERISA are considered again infra Part I.B.3.
46. See McLean, supra note 33, at 600.
47. Brady, supra note 16, at 1104; Rai, supra note 45.
48. See Parija Kavilanz, Surgery and Sightseeing on Your Boss' Dime, CNN
MONEY.COM (Aug. 11, 2010, 1:00 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/08/11/news/companies/
healthcaremedicaltravel/index.htm. For example, Integrated Control Systems, a small
construction firm headquartered in Albuquerque, New Mexico, pays directly for
employees' treatments abroad and has managed to reduce its medical expenditures by
more than ten percent. Boyle, supra note 41, at 43.
49. Nathan Cortez, International Health Care Convergence: The Benefits and Burdens
of Market-Driven Standardization, 26 WIS. INT'L L.J. 646, 673 (2008); Brady, supra note
16, at 1102-03; Bruce Einhorn, Outsourcing the Patients, Bus. WK., Mar. 24, 2008, at 36,
36, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/0812/b4076036777780
.htm; Zoe Galland, Medical Tourism: The Insurance Debate, Bus. WK. (Nov. 9, 2008),
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/nov2008/gb2008119_571910.htm;
Horowitz et al., supra note 7. These insurance companies include Blue Cross Blue Shield
of South Carolina, Aetna, UnitedHealth, Health Net, and United Group Program in
Florida. See Elayne Robertson Demby, Medical Tourism: Prepped for Take-off but Still
Grounded, EMP. BENEFIT NEWS (June 3, 2010), http://ebn.benefitnews.com/news/medical-
tourism-prepped-for-take-off-but-still-grounded-2683657-1.html; Galland, supra. For
example, Blue Cross Blue Shield of South Carolina has created a subsidiary company
through which its members can obtain medical tourism services in lieu of covered
domestic treatments. Einhorn, supra; Companion Global Healthcare, BLUE CROSS BLUE
SHIELD OF S.C., http://www.southcarolinablues.com/members/discountsaddedvalues/
companionglobalhealtcompa.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2011).
50. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1511-
1515, 124 Stat. 119, 252-58 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
51. Cf Kavilanz, supra note 48 (describing employers' efforts to reduce costs by
utilizing medical tourism plans). Larger corporations are beginning to contemplate the
practice as well, including such large-scale employers as Disney and Wells Fargo Insurance
Services. Id.
616 [Vol. 89
FIGHTING FIRE WITH FIRE
of medical tourism's cost savings at the expense of patients and that
employer-sponsored plans will essentially force employees to travel
overseas for all non-urgent medical care.52 However, such behavior is
contrary to the fiduciary duty required by all employee benefit plans
under ERISA." It is difficult to predict precisely how insurance
companies and employers will react to the growing medical tourism
phenomenon, but the substantial cost savings will almost certainly
continue to benefit underinsured middle-class Americans, even as
these benefits spread beyond this initial group.
The passage of the PPACA has altered the dialogue regarding
medical tourism, in large part because of its effects on the need for
viable alternatives to insurance. Current trends are likely to continue
over the next four to five years as the major insurance provisions of
the PPACA are phased in.54 Certain aspects of the PPACA will
undoubtedly change the importance of medical tourism to particular
individuals. Most notably, the PPACA requires all U.S. residents-
with very few exceptions-to carry a minimum amount of health
insurance coverage or face monetary penalties." Medical tourism's
overall value, however, is unlikely to change radically as a result of
this legislation for several reasons. First, the PPACA will not
necessarily result in comprehensive insurance coverage for all
Americans. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that
approximately "23 million nonelderly residents" will remain
uninsured even after the law is fully implemented in 2019.56 These
individuals will continue to benefit from medical tourism's cost
savings as they would have prior to the PPACA's enactment. Second,
even those who acquire or retain coverage under the law may be
underinsured. The PPACA contains a grandfathering provision,
which exempts from most reform requirements all insurance plans in
52. See, e.g., McLean, supra note 33, at 601; Brady, supra note 16, at 1105-06, 1109-12.
53. See Brady, supra note 16, at 1109-13. For a broader discussion of potential
conflicts with ERISA's fiduciary standards, see infra Part I.B.3.
54. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
55. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501(b).
56. Letter from Douglas W. Emendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Honorable
Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 9 (Mar. 20, 2010), http://www.cbo
.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/docl1379/AmendReconProp.pdf. A related estimate suggests that
twenty-one million nonelderly residents will be uninsured in 2016, with four million opting
to pay the penalties for lacking insurance under the Act. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
PAYMENT OF PENALTIES FOR BEING UNINSURED UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION
AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1 (2010), www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/Individual
_MandatePenalties-04-22.pdf. Of these individuals paying the penalty, more than half are
expected to reside in households at or above 300% of the federal poverty level. Id. at 2.
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existence at the time of the enactment." This grandfathering
provision is expected to cover the vast majority of Americans' health
insurance plans." Many individuals who lacked sufficient insurance
under their pre-PPACA plan, therefore, may continue to experience
deficiencies in coverage. Third, the effectiveness and staying power of
the PPACA remains somewhat uncertain due to lawsuits and
contradictory legislation challenging this controversial law." While
the merits of these challenges remain uncertain,"o these efforts do
have the potential to overturn or limit the legislation and its impact
on health insurance coverage nationwide. Thus, the benefits of
medical tourism to individual patients will likely continue despite the
current health care reform.
2. Increased Patient Autonomy
In addition to its significant cost savings, medical tourism
provides a benefit over the American health care system by allowing
patients to exercise greater autonomy over their care. Proponents of
"patient autonomy" argue that patients themselves, rather than other
individuals or external regulatory forces, should be empowered to
make decisions about both the method of their medical treatment and
57. See BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., GRANDFATHERED
HEALTH PLANS UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
(PPACA) 1 (2010), available at http://hrsa.dshs.wa.gov/MedicaidHealthCareReform/CRS/
GrandfatheredHealthPlans.pdf.
58. Id.
59. The PPACA's constitutionality has been challenged through several federal
lawsuits. As of October 2010, at least fifteen separate legal challenges had been filed,
many of which remain unresolved. See KATHLEEN S. SWENDIMAN, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., HEALTH CARE: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LEGISLATIVE POWERS 10-11
(2010), available at http://thf-media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdflR40846.pdf; Kevin Sack,
Judge Rules Health Law Is Constitutional, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2010, at A15, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/health/policy/08health.html?_r=1&ref=us (discussing
the first case of a federal district court judge ruling the law constitutional, a decision ripe
for appeal). One federal district court judge in Virginia has ruled that portions of the
PPACA are unconstitutional. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, No. 3:10CV188-HEH,
2010 WL 5059718, at *13 (E.D. Va. Dec. 13, 2010). A number of states also have enacted
legislation or passed voter referenda which directly challenge PPACA provisions. See
SWENDIMAN, supra, at 12; Richard Cauchi, State Legislation and Actions Challenging
Certain Health Reforms, 2010. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 16,
2010), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=18906.
60. See Sack, supra note 59. See generally JENNIFER STAMAN ET AL., CONGR.
RESEARCH SERV., REQUIRING INDIVIDUALS TO OBTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE: A
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (2010), available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/health/
Constitutionality.pdf (analyzing congressional challenges based on the First, Fifth, and
Tenth Amendments).
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the providers who supply it.6t Though decisions should be informed
by expert advice from medical practitioners to protect the patient
from poor decision making, the patient himself is most directly
impacted by decisions about his medical care.62 Furthermore, most
medical decisions involve value judgments too personal to be
determined by professional advice alone.63 Under this theory,
autonomy of the individual is linked to her personal dignity, and "[t]o
obstruct the capacity for autonomy is to assault an essential part of a
person's humanity . .. ."' For these reasons, advocates of strong
patient autonomy argue that the ultimate decision regarding an
individual's care should be one's own.65 If patients disagree with
practitioners regarding a treatment, patients cannot force
practitioners to act against their moral, professional, or ethical best
judgment. Their autonomy allows patients to "vote with their feet,"
however, in choosing treatments and providers who are better aligned
with their finances, morals, and goals.66
Historically, American patients have enjoyed substantial
autonomy due to strong reliance on market principles in the
American health care system and the substantial emphasis placed on
independence and individuality in American society. 67 Patient
autonomy is becoming more widespread worldwide as patients are
demanding the ability to shop around for lower cost and higher
quality care. 8 Over the last decade, however, the de facto autonomy
of American patients has become increasingly limited by insurance
61. See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New
Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 219-20 (1985); cf Cortez, supra note 49, at 695
(describing how a trend toward market-driven health care convergence will lead to greater
patient autonomy and choice).
62. Shultz, supra note 61, at 220.
63. Id. at 222.
64. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient and Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights and
Obligations in the Physician-Patient Relationship, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 47,
48-49 (1994).
65. See BENJAMIN HOROWITZ LEVI, RESPECTING PATIENT AUTONOMY 10 (1999)
(arguing that "the presumption of personal autonomy is a principal underpinning of many
of our moral and social institutions" and that "if we are to treat them as moral equals,
whose ideas and values and aspirations we must take seriously, autonomous beings must
be allowed to make their own decisions-even when they make decisions we consider to
be bad or imprudent"); Shultz, supra note 61, at 220. But see Pellegrino, supra note 64, at
68 (arguing for limited patient autonomy when the treatment patients demand is harmful,
morally reprehensible, or unnecessary).
66. Cortez, supra note 49, at 696.
67. Id. at 662; Shultz, supra note 61, at 220.
68. Cortez, supra note 49, at 662, 695-96.
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company consolidation,6 9 provider and facility mergers,o and
decreased access to affordable care. Medical tourism acts to combat
these limitations by providing patients with access to a broader
network of providers and facilities to meet many health care needs. 72
Furthermore, once patients have experienced high levels of patient
autonomy, as has traditionally been the case in the United States,
they are unlikely to settle for decreased decision making ability in the
future. 73 Thus, medical tourism may provide an increasingly popular
means for American patients to regain autonomy over their health
care by voting with their feet for more affordable, autonomy-
enhancing providers abroad.
In addition to providing patients with broader access to
affordable medical care, medical tourism is able to increase patients'
autonomy in several key ways. First, medical tourism provides
patients an opportunity to access alternative or controversial medical
procedures.7 4 Patients often desire medical procedures that are not
available in their region, due either to lack of approval by the Food
and Drug Administration ("FDA"), or to a de facto ban on the
procedure resulting from mores of local practitioners or economic
considerations of health insurance companies.75 This has historically
been the case for controversial procedures such as laetrile treatment
for cancer, stem cell therapy, and new forms of reproductive
technology.76 Such procedures are often available overseas at
common medical tourism destinations. While these procedures
could present an increased health risk to patients, medical tourism
69. See generally AM. MED. ASS'N, COMPETITION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: A
COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF U.S. MARKETS, 2007 UPDATE (2007) (describing the
continuing trends in insurer consolidation and the negative impact on competition and
patient care).
70. See Allison Evans Cuellar & Paul J. Gertler, How the Expansion of Hospital
Systems Has Affected Consumers, 24 HEALTH AFF. 213, 217 (2005) (describing the trend
in hospital consolidations and arguing that "consumers were worse off' due to rises in
"hospital market power").
71. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
72. Of course, medical tourism will only increase a patient's provider network for
those procedures which reasonably can be provided through medical tourism: namely,
non-urgent, non-routine medical procedures that a patient is able to schedule in advance.
73. See Cortez, supra note 49, at 662.
74. E.g., Brady, supra note 16, at 1097 (stating that access to alternative or
controversial procedures overseas is a motivation for medical tourists).
75. See, e.g., BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 52, 59; Cortez, supra note 14,
at 78; Brady, supra note 16, at 1099.
76. See Cortez, supra note 14, at 77-78; Brady, supra note 16, at 1097-1100; Horowitz
et al., supra note 7.
77. E.g., WOODMAN, supra note 7, at 10 (describing hip resurfacing as one such not-
yet-approved procedure).
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facilities" are unlikely to conduct these procedures without empirical
evidence of their effectiveness because the facilities' reputations
would be harmed severely by increasing reports of adverse patient
outcomes.79 Furthermore, international jurisdictions are not without
their own safety standards for medical devices and procedures."
Though these standards will undoubtedly differ in some respects from
those imposed by the FDA, the FDA has at times been criticized for
having an unduly burdensome and drawn-out approval process that
impedes patients' ability to benefit from cutting-edge medical
treatments." This process can lead foreign patients to benefit from
breakthrough treatments years before they are available in the
United States.8 2 Even if certain non-FDA approved procedures carry
an increased risk, the need to promote patient autonomy suggests
that the patient, presented with adequate information, should
ultimately determine whether the potential benefits to be derived
from such procedures are worth their inherent risks. Thus, within
reason, medical tourism places this decision back into the hands of
the medical tourist.
Medical tourism also increases patient autonomy by providing
medical tourists with greater flexibility in scheduling procedures and
avoiding significant delays in care. If they do not require immediate
surgery, medical tourists are able to exercise significant control over
78. This Comment uses the term "medical tourism facilities" to describe international
hospitals that cater to and specifically target medical tourists. Two such facilities are
Bumrungrad International Hospital in Bangkok, Thailand, and Indraprastha Apollo
Hospitals in New Delhi, India. See BUMRUNGRAD INT'L HosP., http://www.bumrungrad
.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2011); INDRAPRASTHA APOLLO HOSPS., http://www.apollohosp
delhi.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2011). It is important to remember that many hospitals in
developing countries lack the resources of these medical tourism "hot spots," even in
countries where medical tourism has become an important industry. The quality of care
and experience of patients would differ vastly at less developed hospitals. However, as of
yet, medical tourists have not begun receiving care in such facilities, and this Comment
presumes that those facilities would not have the ability to attract foreign patients or
sustain a medical tourism clientele.
79. See BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 60. The impact of reputation on
medical tourism facilities is considered in greater detail infra Part III.A.1.
80. The FDA has compiled a list of foreign governmental agencies that serve FDA-
like roles in preserving quality of health care. International Organizations and Foreign
Government Agencies, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/International
Programs/Agreements/ucml31179.htm (last updated Nov. 12, 2010).
81. See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 14, at 77-78. For example, proponents of medical
tourism often point to the widespread and successful use of hip resurfacing procedures in
Asia and Europe for many years before the FDA approved the procedure. WOODMAN,
supra note 7, at 10.
82. WOODMAN, supra note 7, at 10; Cortez, supra note 14, at 77-78.
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when their treatment will occur.83 This flexibility allows medical
tourists, to the extent their health will not be adversely impacted, to
arrange their surgeries around their lives, rather than their lives
around their surgeries. Increased flexibility also allows medical
tourists to avoid substantial waiting periods in their home countries
for certain crucial procedures.' Such flexibility provides particularly
strong motivation for medical tourists traveling from countries
practicing socialized medicine, where delays for even life-saving
procedures can be significant." Though surgical procedures are more
accessible in the United States than in many other countries, the
waiting period for medical care in the United States is increasingly
onerous, 86 and shorter waiting periods may provide substantial
motivation for American medical tourists facing delays.
83. Cf Medical Tourism Hearing, supra note 17, at 5-6 (statement of Maggi Ann
Grace, patient advocate) (describing one patient's effort to schedule his heart surgery in
India after running into obstacles to the surgery at home).
84. See id. at 4 (stating that for her husband to obtain insurance in the United States
covering his surgery, he would have had to wait a year); WOODMAN, supra note 7, at 11.
85. See WOODMAN, supra note 7, at 11; Cortez, supra note 14, at 79.
86. See, e.g., MERRITT HAWKINS & AssOCs., 2009 SURVEY OF PHYSICIAN
APPOINTMENT WAIT TIMES 14 (2009), http://www.merritthawkins.com/pdf/mha2009wait
timesurvey.pdf (finding an average waiting period of more than twenty days for new
patient appointments over five specialties). It may be helpful to note that, though this
study revealed decreased waiting times since 2004, the study was conducted during the
height of the most recent economic downturn when medical visits had reportedly
decreased overall. Id. at 13-14.
87. American tourists may be particularly motivated to participate in organ
transplantation overseas. See BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 90; McLean, supra
note 33, at 597; see also Waiting Time by Blood Type, ORGAN PROCUREMENT &
TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ (follow "Data" hyperlink;
then follow "National Data" hyperlink; then select "Median Waiting Time" category and
"All" Organ category; then follow "Waiting Time by Blood Type" hyperlink) (last visited
Jan. 3, 2011) (suggesting that the majority of patients requiring organ transplantation
remain on the waiting list for a year or more). "Transplant tourism" has recently attracted
criticism because a black market for organs exists in countries such as South Africa, India,
and China, through which organs may be purchased illegally from members of vulnerable
populations, such as the poor, who are willing to sell their organs. BOOKMAN &
BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 90, 122; Yosuke Shimazono, The State of the International
Organ Trade: A Provisional Picture Based on Integration of Available Information, 85
BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 955, 956 (2007). At least in theory, such concerns should be
addressed through the standardization and quality assurance procedures already in place;
there appears to be no empirical evidence that high-quality medical tourist destinations
frequented by American medical tourists are availing themselves of this black market.
Though such considerations raise significant concern regarding the impact of medical
tourism on local populations, see generally, Shimazono, supra, these considerations are
best addressed by policies and laws in the destination country and are beyond the scope of
this Comment.
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3. The "Luxury" Factor
Medical tourism also provides a "luxury experience" for patients,
which is relatively unheard of in the U.S. health care industry.'
Medical tourists are often astonished by the quality of service they
receive and the personal attention with which it is rendered. 9
Compared to many American hospitals, in which understaffing may
result in reduced attentiveness to patients,90 many medical tourism
destinations are staffed to provide personal attention from both
doctors and nursing staff.9' In some locales, private nursing care is
offered twenty-four hours a day.'
Beyond the quality of their medical staff, medical tourism
destinations also provide additional luxury amenities and services to
patients. Hospitals frequented by medical tourists often are designed
to provide patients with the look and feel of a five-star hotel.93 For
example, Apollo Hospitals in New Delhi, India, allows patients to
reserve suites with a separate lounge and bathroom for a patient's
attendants and a dining area with microwave, refrigerator, and
several LCD televisions.94 Bumrungrad International Hospital in
Bangkok, Thailand, offers a "Great Chefs program" for its patients,
for which some of Thailand's premier chefs have designed patient
menus showcasing local Thai cuisine." Further, medical tourism
destinations offer patients the opportunity to experience local
attractions. Each of the most common medical tourism destinations
88. See Howard D. Bye, Shopping Abroad for Medical Care: The Next Step in
Controlling the Escalating Health Care Costs of American Group Health Plans?, HEALTH
LAW., Apr. 2007, at 30, 31.
89. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 41, at 44; Klaus, supra note 8, at 226; Rebecca Leung,
Vacation, Adventure and Surgery?: Elective Surgeries by World-Class Doctors at Third-
World Prices, 60 MINUTES (Sept. 4, 2005), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/
60minutes/main689998.shtml. For a first-hand account of one medical tourist's experience,
see Medical Tourism Hearing, supra note 17, at 2-8; Maggi Ann Grace, HOWARD'S
HEART, http://maggigrace.com/howardsheart (last visited Jan. 3, 2011) (stating that both
the patient and his companion, the author of the blog, were treated "like royalty" during
their hospital stay in India). Testimonials of high attentiveness and quality of care have
continued to be reported by more recent medical tourists. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 41,
at 42-43; Klaus, supra note 8, at 226.
90. See Medical Tourism Hearing, supra note 17, at 5; Boyle, supra note 41, at 44.
91. See Medical Tourism Hearing, supra note 17, at 6; Boyle, supra note 41, at 44;
Leung, supra note 89.
92. Boyle, supra note 41, at 44; Parsiyar, supra note 13, at 387.
93. See Leung, supra note 89.
94. Category of Rooms Apollo Hospitals New Delhi, APOLLO HOSPS., http://www
.apollohospitals.com/category-delhi.php (last visited Jan. 3, 2011).
95. Bumrungrad Launches 2009 Great Chefs Program, BUMRUNGRAD INT'L HOSP.,
http://www.bumrungrad.com/hospital-news.aspx#GreatChef (last visited Jan. 3, 2011).
2011] 623
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
offers Americans natural beauty, popular tourist attractions, and the
opportunity to experience an "exotic" culture.96 After surgery,
patients may convalesce at relaxing locales such as beaches or in spa
resorts.97 To capitalize on these attractions, medical tourism brokers
frequently offer packages which, in addition to medical care, provide
sightseeing tours of local attractions." Such experiences are available
to all medical tourists, including those individuals who would not
have been motivated to travel to these destinations without the
medical component of their trip. Taken as a whole, these benefits to
medical tourists provide extra motivation for receiving care overseas.
4. Benefits to American Patients Generally
In addition to the various benefits for individuals, medical
tourism may provide benefits for the American patient population as
a whole, including improved quality of care and decreased health care
costs. The American health care industry is currently facing critical
shortages in medical staff.99 Physician shortages have been noted
throughout the nation, including in various specializations, and are
expected to increase.100 Nurses are in particularly short supply; in
2000, demand for registered nurses exceeded supply by more than
100,000, and by 2020 this shortage is expected to increase more than
two hundred percent.10' As the population continues to age rapidly
96. See, e.g., BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 134-35; Klaus, supra note 8, at
228. Patients sometimes engage in sightseeing post-operatively; however, this practice is
generally discouraged due to the increased risk of adverse health effects. See Boyle, supra
note 41, at 45. But see Howze, supra note 23, at 1028 (suggesting that some facilities may
fail to discourage post-surgical sightseeing).
97. See Boyle, supra note 41, at 44; Leung, supra note 89.
98. See Klaus, supra note 8, at 228.
99. See, e.g., Medical Tourism Hearing, supra note 17, at 5 ("Highly skilled nurses in
our hospitals are stretched beyond human limitations."); see also Terry, supra note 7, at
458 ("[D]eveloped countries have been unable to satisfy their demand for foreign-trained
doctors, and more recently, for nurses.").
100. See Herbert Pardes, Opinion, The Coming Shortage of Doctors, WALL ST. J., Nov.
5, 2009, at A19, available at http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SB10001424052748703574604574
499423536935290.html; Robert Pear, Doctor Shortage Proves Obstacle to Obama Goals,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/health/
policy/27care.html.
101. Addressing the Nursing Shortage: Background Brief, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., http://www.kaiseredu.org/topics-im.asp?imlD=1&parentlD=61&id=138 (last
visited Jan. 3, 2011); see also Robert J. Rosseter, Nursing Shortage Fact Sheet, AM. ASS'N
OF COLLS. OF NURSING 1-2, http://www.aacn.nche.edu/medialpdflNrsgShortageFS.pdf
(last updated Sept. 20, 2010) (citing several recent studies that indicate the demand for
registered nurses will increase over the next ten to twenty years while the supply of
registered nurses will decrease).
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and the need for medical care increases, these shortages are likely to
grow and may create grave deficiencies in medical care. 02
Medical tourism provides an effective remedy for these concerns.
As medical tourism becomes a more prevalent practice, it will likely
help ease the burden on American health care providers by removing
some of the current patient load to providers overseas. By reducing
the strain on the American health care system, medical tourism
should allow American providers to supply a more uniform and
patient-oriented standard of care, which in turn should lead to
improved patient outcomes. 0 3 Moreover, medical tourism may also
help reduce American health care costs. Recent political discourse
regarding health insurance has brought to light the cost benefits of
increased competition in the health insurance industry.'04 Medical
tourism may provide an effective means of introducing beneficial
competition into the health care market. Theoretically, this effect
could occur in two ways. First, medical tourism may provide direct
competition for American health care providers, forcing them to
lower the costs of many procedures in order to compete with overseas
facilities."o' This effect has already been observed to a limited extent;
for example, one South Dakota surgery facility has reduced the cost
of its joint replacement surgeries to less than half the average U.S.
cost in order to compete with overseas providers.106 Such cost
102. See Pardes, supra note 100; Pear, supra note 100; Rosseter, supra note 101, at 1-2.
Such trends may increase with the influx of newly-insured individuals after the PPACA
takes effect. See, e.g., Kevin B. O'Reilly, Health Reform's Next Challenge: Who Will Care
for the Newly Insured?, AM. MED. NEWS (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2010/04/12/prl10412.htm.
103. See generally ROBERT L. KANE ET AL., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH
AND QUALITY, NURSE STAFFING AND QUALITY OF PATIENT CARE (2007), http://www
.ahrq.gov/downloads/pub/evidence/pdf/nursestaff/nursestaff.pdf (correlating nursing
shortages to adverse patient outcomes, including mortality rates, increased lengths of stay,
and hospital-acquired illness and infection). But see generally David C. Goodman & Kevin
Grumbach, Does Having More Physicians Lead to Better Health System Performance?, 299
JAMA 335 (2008) (arguing that an increased physician pool per capita does not
necessarily translate to increased quality of care, particularly when increases occur in
oversaturated areas or specialties).
104. See Michael E. Chernow et al., Geographic Correlation Between Large-Firm
Commercial Spending and Medicare Spending, 16 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 131, 131, 135
(2010) (concluding that more effort promoting competitive pricing for health care services
is needed if private health care markets are to reduce costs); Barack Obama and Joe
Biden's Plan to Lower Health Care Costs and Ensure Affordable, Accessible Health
Coverage for All, BARACKOBAMA.COM, http://www.barackobama.com/pdflissues/Health
CareFullPlan.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2011) (proposing increased competition in private
insurance and drug markets as a partial solution to soaring health care costs).
105. See Parsiyar, supra note 13, at 387; Horowitz et al., supra note 7.
106. Van Dusen, supra note 11.
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reduction could become more widespread across both facilities and
procedures as medical tourism continues to grow.
Second, medical tourism could provide a more viable alternative
to current insurance plans, allowing greater numbers of patients to
bypass the American insurance industry when receiving medical care.
This could reduce premiums as insurance companies are forced to
market their plans more effectively to prospective patients and
preserve their business.107 In a similar vein, insurance companies may
be forced to incorporate foreign providers into their plans, providing
affordable options for those remaining uninsured.1 o8 The availability
of lower-cost plans to individuals and small businesses should, in turn,
reduce the number of underinsured individuals.
Though falling prices could lead health care providers to reduce
the quality of care or insurance companies to reduce the quality of
coverage, they would be unwise to do so when high-quality foreign
facilities and providers are still available at comparable prices. The
addition of medical tourism facilities, and thus a substantial number
of additional providers less attuned to the American health care
market, will tend to break down the effectiveness of any oligopolistic
tendencies among American providers.109 At a minimum, both price
and quality would have to be comparable before American patients
otherwise open to medical tourism could be persuaded to forego
medical tourism's significant benefits. Thus, medical tourism is likely
to continue to effect positive change on the domestic health care
industry, even as it grows in popularity among American consumers.
107. Though the passage of the PPACA and its individual mandate to retain health
insurance may limit the incentive for some patients to bypass the insurance industry in this
way, millions of Americans are still expected to choose to remain uninsured by paying the
required fine. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. Thus, insurers may still be
forced to price their plans competitively to remain attractive to these individuals.
108. Klaus, supra note 8, at 235; see also Cortez, supra note 14, at 121 (providing
examples of private insurers that utilize foreign health care providers).
109. See Mattoo & Rathindran, supra note 39, at 365-66 (describing the health
insurance industry as oligopolistic and predicting that it "will gravitate toward an
equilibrium where each firm chooses the strategy of not offering consumers the possibility
of cheaper care . .. as long as other firms behave the same way"). An oligopoly is a market
form in which only a few sellers dominate the market, creating an incentive to retain high
prices to preserve the profit margin for each seller. BLACK'S LAW DiciONARY 1120 (8th
ed. 2004). Though the PPACA will provide subsidies to low-income families to obtain
insurance through public exchanges, these exchanges-as well as the legislation as a
whole-rely upon existing private insurers to provide health insurance. See Focus on
Health Reform, supra note 6, at 4-5. Thus, the legislation will not ensure that additional
sellers enter the market and, absent price ceilings on insurance coverage, may be
ineffectual to alter the oligopolistic tendencies already inherent in the industry.
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B. Medical Tourism's Regulatory Pitfalls
The substantial benefits of medical tourism may also expose
patients to a number of risks. Medical tourism has been criticized
largely because procedures obtained abroad circumvent the complex
regulatory framework designed to protect American patients.110 This
section will discuss three regulatory pitfalls medical tourists may
encounter as patients abroad, which analysts have noted in their
attempt to criticize the practice: (1) uncertain quality of care, (2)
absence of an effective legal remedy for patients claiming injury from
medical malpractice, and (3) conflict with the ERISA fiduciary duties.
This section will argue that these pitfalls are likely to be less prevalent
than many risk-averse critics have argued. Consequently, this analysis
will demonstrate that the risks described below are outweighed by the
benefits to both individuals and American patients as a population.
Medical tourism, as a net positive practice, should be embraced as a
viable alternative for American patients.
1. Quality of Care
The primary concern of critics of medical tourism is the safety of
American patients."' When medical tourism first emerged as a
widespread phenomenon in the United States, many worried that the
quality of care provided in medical tourism facilities would be far
below the quality of care available in the United States.' 12 Such
criticisms carry substantial weight. Despite medical tourism's salient
benefits, both financial and otherwise, high-quality patient care is
needed to justify medical tourism. The practice could not readily be
condoned or represent a valid trade-off for consumers if it posed a
significantly greater risk to the health and safety of patients than the
care available to them domestically."'
110. See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 14, at 73 ("[P]atients are opting out of our health care
system and the delicate equilibrium of policy choices that it represents."). See generally
Brady, supra note 16 (criticizing medical outsourcing as a violation of ERISA); Mirrer-
Singer, supra note 16 (arguing for increased regulation of medical tourism because
overseas jurisdictions lack adequate means of legal redress for malpractice).
111. See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 14, at 72-73; Brady, supra note 16, at 1096-97; Howze,
supra note 23, at 1026-29.
112. See, e.g., Medical Tourism Hearing, supra note 17, at 45; Klaus, supra note 8, at
234.
113. The critical necessity of high-quality health care is not lost on the average
consumer; a recent report suggests that quality remains a strong motivating factor in a
patient's choice of provider. See DELOITrE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, supra note 2,
at 5 (reporting that eighty-eight percent of consumers surveyed would consider seeking
care outside of their community if the cost were the same but the outcomes were better
than those available locally).
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Fears of poor quality result in part from stereotypes regarding
doctors and facilities in developing countries.'14 In reality, the quality
of care available at common medical tourism destinations appears at
least comparable to the care available to the average patient in the
United States."' Furthermore, death rates and adverse outcome rates
for patients undergoing cardiac procedures at hospitals in India and
Thailand are comparable to and, in some instances, lower than those
reported at American hospitals." 6 Such quantitative comparisons,
however, are infrequent, and the general qualitative comparisons that
are more common have tended not to parse out the component
measures of quality of care, nor explain how the overall comparison is
reached." 7 Thus, a closer analysis of quality is necessary to determine
whether the medical care provided to medical tourists is truly
comparable to care provided in the United States, thereby providing
a favorable trade-off to consumers who elect medical tourism.
a. Measuring Quality of Care
Generally, "quality of care" is measured by the effectiveness and
safety of health care services delivered to patient populations."'
Beyond this broad definition, however, quality is notoriously difficult
to measure or define.119
114. See WOODMAN, supra note 7, at 21.
115. See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 14, at 82-85; Klaus, supra note 8, at 225-26. But see
Parsiyar, supra note 13, at 391 (suggesting there is insufficient statistical data to make such
quality comparisons confidently, especially in light of conflicting qualitative observations
from patients and analysts).
116. See Mattoo & Rathindran, supra note 39, at 360; Klaus, supra note 8, at 225.
117. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Protecting Patients with Passports: Medical Tourism and
the Patient-Protection Argument, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1492 (2010); Milstein & Smith
supra note 34, at 1639; Klaus, supra note 8, at 225.
118. See, e.g., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTHCARE QUALITY REPORT 2007, at iv-1
(2007), http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/nhqr07/nhqr07.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL
HEALTHCARE QUALITY REPORT 2007].
119. Cortez, supra note 14, at 102-03; see also NAT'L COMM. FOR QUALITY
ASSURANCE, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO HEALTH CARE QUALITY 6 (2007),
http://www.ncqa.org[Portals/0/Publications/Resource%2OLibrary/NCQAPrimer-web.pdf
(describing how two government agencies define quality of health care). For example, the
Joint Commission International, discussed in greater detail infra notes 149-54 and
accompanying text, defines quality of care as "ft]he degree to which health services for
individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are
consistent with current professional knowledge." JOINT COMM'N INT'L, JOINT
COMMISSION INTERNATIONAL ACCREDITATION STANDARDS FOR HOSPITALS 179 (2d
ed. 2002). In contrast, the Institute of Medicine places additional requirements of quality
on practitioners, defining health care quality based on whether treatment is "safe,
effective, patient-centered, timely, efficient and equitable." NAT'L COMM. FOR QUALITY
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Since 2000, significant energy has been focused on analyzing
quality of care among U.S. health care facilities.1 20 Despite an
increasing availability of quality measurement data, comparing safety
on a state or local level is practically impossible. 121 Federal policy
makes reporting of adverse events voluntary for medical facilities,
and few states require such events to be reported to the public.122
Where reports are made, they may be incomplete when compared to
the number and scope of errors that actually occur.' Substantial
improvements in evaluation of care are unlikely, and facilities are
even less likely to be evaluated individually in the near future.124
ASSURANCE, supra, at 6 (quoting INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A
NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, at xi (2001)).
120. See, e.g., NATIONAL HEALTHCARE QUALITY REPORT 2007, supra note 118, at 6.
For example, the Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS"), through its
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality ("AHRQ") arm, has collected over 50,000
data points since 2000 by surveying dozens of state and private entities to assess quality of
health care in the United States. See id. at 1, 10, 23-24; AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE
RESEARCH & QUALITY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., WHAT IS AHRQ? 4-
7 (2002), http://archive.ahrq.gov/about/whatis.pdf. The increased focus on quality
measurement was spurred by the publication in 2000 of a landmark study, INST. OF MED.,
To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds.,
2000), which revealed significant failings in the quality of American health care. See
NATIONAL HEALTHCARE QUALITY REPORT 2007, supra note 118, at iv, 6. This study and
the corresponding changes in American health care quality are discussed infra Part I.B.I.c.
121. NATIONAL HEALTHCARE QUALITY REPORT 2007, supra note 118, at 7.
122. Cathleen F. Crowley & Eric Nalder, Within Health Care Hides Massive, Avoidable
Death Toll, HEARST NEWSPAPERS: DEAD BY MISTAKE (Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.chron
.com/disp/story.mpl/deadbymistake/6555095.html. Only twenty states and the District of
Columbia require mandatory reporting of surgical outcomes and medical errors. Id. Of
those twenty states, only five currently provide hospital-specific data to the public. See
State Reporting: Reporting Snapshot, HEARST NEWSPAPERS: DEAD BY MISTAKE,
http://www.chron.com/deadbymistake/hospitals/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2011). For an example
of health care information available to the public through a state agency, see Cal. Office of
the Patient Advocate, Are You Getting Quality Health Care?, CA.GOV, http://www.opa.ca
.gov/report-card/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2011). Even where these laws are in place, the
legislation may lack either funding or adequate enforcement measures, or both. See Eric
Nalder, Washington Law Lacks Both Money and Teeth, HEARST NEWSPAPERS: DEAD BY
MISTAKE (July 30, 2009), http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/deadbymistake/65552
05.html.
123. Crowley & Nalder, supra note 122.
124. Efforts to implement more universal and exacting reporting standards have been
met with resistance. See DEAN M. HARRIS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN HEALTHCARE
LAW AND ETHICS 71 (2nd ed. 2003). This resistance is due in part to substantial concern
from health care providers that outcome reporting could be used against them in
malpractice suits. See id. The PPACA has prioritized quality of care initiatives, including
the creation of a "national strategy for quality improvement in health care" and an
interagency working group to address national quality of care issues. Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-48, §§ 3011-3012, 124 Stat. 119, 378-81 (2010)
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280j). The law also requires triennial evaluation of quality
assessment measures and the creation of new quality assessment measures as deemed
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When data are made available by American facilities, such
information is rarely accessible to consumers to assist them in making
health care decisions.'25 Even where information on individual
American facilities is provided to consumers, it is generally presented
in a highly technical fashion, which is difficult for laypersons to
understand or use effectively.126 As a result, few patients appear to
use quality indicators when choosing a health care provider. 127
Like their U.S. counterparts, little evidentiary data are available
on medical tourism facilities, even among those facilities that have
received international accreditation and high marks from
independent evaluative sources.128 Critics have decried the safety of
medical tourism facilities as uncertain due to the dearth of statistical
quality comparisons between American and international
providers.129 Such comparisons between American providers are
similarly unavailable, however, given the lack of nationwide and
necessary to more accurately assess the quality of American health care. Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 3013 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395aaaa-1).
However, the law provides no substantive guidelines for these assessments or the likely
impact of these mandates, and their effect on health care quality remains unclear.
125. Though several states provide publicly-available "report cards" on health care
providers that compare facilities across various quality measures, see, e.g., Cal. Office of
the Patient Advocate, supra note 122, the vast majority of states do not make even
mandatory quality reports from individual facilities available to the public. Crowley &
Nalder, supra note 122. A primary exception to this general rule is the information
provided by the Joint Commission through their online "Quality Check." See The Joint
Comm'n, Quality Check, QUALITYCHECK.ORG, http://www.qualitycheck.org/consumer/
searchQCR.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2011). Quality reports are available for specific
facilities throughout the United States and are presented in a relatively user-friendly
manner. See id. However, quality is only indicated to consumers via qualitative reports
relative to an unidentified national average, rather than through quantitative data. See id.
In enacting the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-41,
119 Stat. 424 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 299b-21 to -26 (2006)), intended to increase
voluntary error reporting among hospitals and other care facilities, Congress has also
expressed a federal policy deeming patient safety information identifiable to individual
health care facilities to be confidential from members of the public and privileged against
law enforcement and civil discovery processes. See Patient Safety and Quality
Improvement Act § 299b-22; William E. Fassett, Patient Safety and Quality Improvement
Act of 2005, 40 ANNALS PHARMACOTHERAPY 917, 917-19 (2006), available at http://www
.theannals.com/cgi/reprint/40/5/917. Thus, much of the data which might be used by
consumers to make informed choices regarding their health providers remains shielded
from their access.
126. See NAT'L COMM. FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE, supra note 119, at 15-16.
127. Id. at 15 (stating that, in 2004, approximately six percent of American patients
used quality indicators when selecting a doctor, and only eight percent of American
patients used this information to select a hospital).
128. See Terry, supra note 7, at 464. A more in-depth discussion of accreditation can be
found infra Part I.B.1.b.
129. See Terry, supra note 7, at 464; Brady, supra note 16, at 1096.
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facility-specific mandatory reporting.130 Though additional empirical
data regarding the quality of specific medical tourism facilities would
lend greater credibility to claims of high quality care, the lack of
consistent data on American facilities indicates that missing data on
medical tourism facilities are not necessarily indicative of sub-par
quality among those facilities. Given that direct quantitative
comparison is difficult, it is necessary to look at additional quality
indicators to understand fully the quality of care provided by medical
tourism facilities.
b. Shared Quality Assurance Measures
Despite the absence of adequate evidentiary measures to assess
quality, either at home or abroad, several quality assurance measures
indicate high quality among common medical tourism facilities.
International facilities do not share many of the same requirements as
U.S. health care facilities because of disparate-although not per se
inferior-regulatory requirements in other countries.13' The presence
of these quality assurance mechanisms indicates that concerns over
quality of care in medical tourism facilities are misplaced.
Despite these inherent differences, patients in industrialized
nations have come to demand the relatively high quality of care to
which they are accustomed in their home facilities.'32 In order to
attract patients and cater to the increasing demand for high-quality
medical care overseas, medical tourism destinations have broadened
their quality assurance mechanisms to conform to standards of
industrialized care.'33 The United States, for example, shares two
primary quality assurance mechanisms with common medical tourism
facilities: facility accreditation and physician licensure and training.'34
American hospitals and other health care facilities are primarily
regulated through a form of voluntary industry self-regulation known
130. See HARRIS, supra note 124, at 71; Brady, supra note 16, at 1096.
131. See BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 145-47 (describing unique
regulatory standards for medical procedures, devices, and pharmaceuticals). These
standards will differ depending on the political, economic, and social ideologies of the
nation and its people. See, e.g., id. at 66-82 (describing the varying degrees of public-
private health care sector interaction in medical tourism destinations and the effect on
medical tourism regulation in these countries). However, health care regulatory standards
appear to be converging toward more internationally recognized standards of care,
particularly in those countries attempting to attract an international patient market. See id.
at 139-51; Cortez, supra note 49, at 664-87.
132. See BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 145.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 147-51.
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as "accreditation.""' This process is carried out in the United States
by the Joint Commission,136 a private nonprofit organization which
conducts on-site surveys of participating care facilities to assess
compliance with a broad range of detailed quality standards."'
Accreditation does not provide a means of direct regulation, but
tends to signal that the facility holds itself to certain high standards of
quality.' 8 The American medical insurance industry has placed
significant weight on Joint Commission accreditation, as many
insurance companies require health care facilities to carry this
accreditation before third-party payment is authorized. 3 9 Moreover,
the Joint Commission carries a "quasi-governmental status" within
the United States due to its statutory authority to certify Medicaid
and Medicare eligibility and its status as the primary private
certification mechanism for health care facilities to receive such
eligibility.'40 Thus, though not legally required for operation in the
United States, Joint Commission accreditation indicates that the
accredited organization meets at least minimum acceptable standards
of care as recognized by the federal government and most states.
Because of its value in helping facilities avoid duplicative
credentialing surveys,14' the Joint Commission is responsible for over
ninety percent of hospital accreditation in the United States. 42
On the other hand, no binding international standard for hospital
quality currently exists.143 Hospital quality may vary significantly
between countries, in part based on disparate access to resources and
adequately trained staff.'" Quality is a vital consideration for medical
135. ROBERT I. FIELD, HEALTH CARE REGULATION IN AMERICA: COMPLEXITY,
CONFRONTATION, AND COMPROMISE 43 (2007).
136. See HARRIS, supra note 124, at 71.
137. See FIELD, supra note 135, at 43; HARRIS, supra note 124, at 75; Klaus, supra note
8, at 236. Through auditors, the Joint Commission surveys facilities for quality standards
compliance and grants or denies accreditation; if granted, accreditation then must be
renewed every three years. See FIELD, supra note 135, at 43-44.
138. Cortez, supra note 49, at 670.
139. Id. at 670-71.
140. Id.; see also Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No 89-97, 79 Stat. 286,
326-27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb (2006 & Supp. II 2009)) (authorizing
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals to certify facilities for Medicare
eligibility); David Gourley, Competitor to the Joint Commission Approved by CMS,
Focus: J. RESPIRATORY CARE & SLEEP MED., July-Aug. 2009, at 12, 12 (describing the
Joint Commission's status as the means of Medicare and Medicaid certification and its
primacy among certification methods).
141. See FIELD, supra note 135, at 43; HARRIS, supra note 124, at 75-76.
142. Gourley, supra note 140, at 12.
143. See BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 145-47.
144. See Cortez, supra note 49, at 702-03.
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tourism facilities, however, as providing high-quality care is a
functional requirement for inducing medical tourists to engage in
health care overseas.145 Because fears about sub-standard quality of
care have remained a primary barrier to medical tourism's
146
expansion, despite evidence that such fears are largely
unfounded,147 medical tourism facilities have attempted to assuage
potential patients' fears by submitting to voluntary accreditation
procedures akin to those standard in the United States.148 One of the
leading sources of international accreditation is the Joint Commission
International ("JCI"), the international arm of the Joint
Commission.149 Though JCI accreditation is a separate process from
Joint Commission accreditation for facilities in the United States, the
method of assessment used by both organizations is the same, and
accreditation of both organizations is established based on
compliance with very similar standards.O Because of its close
relationship to the Joint Commission-as well as the Joint
Commission's governing trade organizations, such as the American
Medical Association and the American College of Physicians-
accreditation by the JCI carries significant clout in the international
community,"' particularly among Americans looking to ensure that
medical tourism facilities are held to a quality comparable to that of
American facilities.152 Most nations perceive JCI accreditation as an
indication that a facility meets high standards of quality and is
dedicated to continued quality improvement.153 Furthermore, unlike
the Joint Commission's role in the United States, the JCI does not
confine its primary purpose to accreditation; in addition to its
significant role in accrediting facilities, the JCI has also begun to
establish itself as a leader in promulgating international health care
145. See BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 145. The implications of poor
quality on the success of medical tourism facilities are discussed infra Part III.A.1.
146. See BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 145 ("To the extent that the
supplying physician, institution, or country cannot provide satisfactory demonstration of
quality, [medical tourists] will take their business elsewhere.").
147. DELOITrE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, supra note 2, at 8.
148. See id. at 8-9.
149. JOINT COMM'N INT'L, supra note 119, at 1; see also BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN,
supra note 7, at 148; DELOITrE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, supra note 2, at 8.
150. Compare JOINT COMM'N INT'L, supra note 119, at 171-72 (providing a
comprehensive description of the JCI accreditation procedures), with JOINT COMM'N,
COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: THE OFFICIAL
HANDBOOK ACC 1-ACC 62 (2007) (providing a comprehensive description of the Joint
Commission accreditation assessment).
151. Cortez, supra note 49, at 671.
152. See DELOITrE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, supra note 2, at 9.
153. See Cortez, supra note 49, at 671.
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quality standards and educating health care providers worldwide
about best practices. 15 4 This international focus on improvement of
health care safety and quality suggests that the JCI has a legitimate
interest and increasing experience in promoting high quality health
care on an international scale.
A second principal indicator of quality of care shared by U.S.
and medical tourism facilities is the physician credentialing and
licensing process. In the United States, physicians are required to pass
several hurdles before being allowed to practice medicine. American
doctors must first graduate from a certified medical school, which
offers standardized training for its students, and they must pass a
rigorous, standardized board examination, the United States Medical
Licensing Examination."' Licensure is required by state statutes,
which authorize licensing boards to act under the state's police power
to protect the public welfare.'56 In addition to these baseline
requirements, physicians who hope to practice in a particular
specialty often submit to private board certification within that
specialty, requiring the physician to pass another rigorous
examination to demonstrate competency in that area of expertise.'
Together, these requirements ensure that American physicians have
the knowledge the American medical community deems necessary to
practice medicine.
The boundaries of the states' police powers stretch only so far,
however, and American medical boards have no jurisdiction to
impose licensure requirements on practitioners who operate on
American citizens in foreign nations.' 8 Doctors practicing at medical
154. See id. Improving the quality of care internationally through education and
standards-based assessment has been an active goal of the JCI since its inception. See
JOINT COMM'N INT'L, supra note 119, at 1. The Joint Commission does not conduct
educational programs directly, but does engage in education and more direct standards
promulgation activities, including within the United States, through another international
affiliate, the Joint Commission Resources. See Facts About the Joint Commission, JOINT
COMM'N (Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.jointcommission.org/facts-about-the- oint
commission/ (follow "Download" hyperlink).
155. FIELD, supra note 135, at 21-22; About USMLE, U.S. MED. LICENSING
EXAMINATION, http://www.usmle.org/general-information/generalinformation about
.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2011).
156. HARRIS, supra note 124, at 71-72.
157. FIELD, supra note 135, at 26-27.
158. The Supreme Court has recognized a broad right of states to impose licensure
requirements on professionals "as part of their power to protect the public health, safety,
and other valid interests," but this right is justified only insofar as it regulates practitioners
"within their boundaries." See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (2004). As a
practical matter, even if the Constitution purported to provide jurisdiction to regulate any
providers operating on a state citizen, regardless of their location or citizenship, imposing
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tourism facilities must be licensed according to the laws of the
facility's country of origin, and U.S. requirements are consequently
inapplicable.159 Medical tourism facilities, however, appear to
understand the value of licensing and credentialing familiar to
medical tourists. In an attempt to attract medical tourists and prove a
commitment to quality care, medical tourism facilities have tended to
hire physicians educated at highly reputable teaching facilities in the
United States and other industrialized nations. 6 0 Many of these
physicians also carry certification in their practice specialty. 6 1
Furthermore, many medical tourism facilities allow patients to review
the credentials of their physicians online before being referred to a
particular provider, allowing medical tourists with specific licensing
and/or credentialing preferences to select providers who meet these
criteria.162
Because there is currently no international medical licensure or
credentialing system available, requirements for achieving a medical
degree and receiving licensure in foreign countries will differ from the
requirements imposed within the United States. 163 However, the
simple fact that a provider has received medical training outside the
United States is by no means an indicator of inferior quality of care.
Even patients in American hospitals are not guaranteed to receive
care from American-trained providers, as approximately twenty-five
percent of all practicing physicians and fourteen percent of all
practicing nurses in the United States received training overseas.iM
such regulations on foreign nationals practicing outside the United States is a practical
impossibility.
159. BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 149-50.
160. See Klaus, supra note 8, at 225-26; DELOrrE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS,
supra note 2, at 8; see also Meet Our Doctors, BUMRUNGRAD INT'L HOSP., http://www
.bumrungrad.com/overseas-medical-care/medical-services/meet-our-doctors.aspx (last
visited Jan. 3, 2011).
161. See BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 150-51; Klaus, supra note 8, at 226.
For example, over 200 physicians employed at Bumrungrad International Hospital were
board certified in the United States, signaling that they have passed the same rigorous
equivalency exams required of U.S. physicians. BUMRUNGRAD INT'L HOSP.,
http://www.bumrungrad.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2011).
162. See, e.g., Plan Your Visit, APOLLO Hosps., http://influx.co.in/apollo/apollonew/
international patient-services plan.php (last visited Jan. 3, 2011); FAQ's, BUMRUNGRAD
INT'L HosP., http://www.bumrungrad.com/overseas-medical-care/faq-s.aspx (last visited
Jan. 3, 2011).
163. See BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 150-51; Klaus, supra note 8, at 227-
28.
164. Cortez, supra note 49, at 665; Mattoo & Rathindran, supra note 39, at 359-60;
Boyle, supra note 41, at 44. Foreign-educated physicians also comprise approximately
twenty percent of American medical school faculty. Cortez, supra note 49, at 665; Mattoo
& Rathindran, supra note 39, at 359.
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Developing countries such as India, the Philippines, and Iran
represent the eight largest suppliers of foreign physicians to the
United States.16 1 Practitioners trained in developing countries are able
to provide high-quality care because medical curricula have become
increasingly standardized from country to country. Organizations
such as the Institute for International Medical Education and the
World Federation for Medical Education promulgate international
medical education standards, and developing countries increasingly
adapt their curricula to incorporate more traditional Western medical
curricula and modern bioscience research.166 Because physicians
employed by medical tourism facilities are likely to have training and
educational experience equal to many American physicians, they are
likely capable of providing similarly safe and high-quality treatment
as that received in the United States.
These two elemental markers of health care quality-facility
accreditation and physician licensure and training-suggest that
patient safety and quality of care are, at the very least, likely to be
comparable between U.S. and medical tourism facilities. As one
analyst has suggested, "[s]urgical care provided in a Joint Commission
Accredited hospital in India by a member of the Royal College of
Surgeons is unlikely to be inferior to the same care provided in an
American hospital with Joint Commission Accreditation by a
member of the American College of Surgeons."1 67
c. Qualitative Comparison with United States Care
Despite the quality assurance mechanisms in place to protect
medical tourists,168 critics of medical tourism have suggested (or, more
often, implied) that medical tourism is inherently inferior in quality to
care provided in American facilities. 169 According to such reasoning,
this inherent lack of quality, whether based on challenges unique to
the medical tourism context or assumptions of sub-par care available
in developing countries, makes medical tourism an invalid or
inherently dangerous option when compared to care received in the
United States.170
165. Cortez, supra note 49, at 665; Mattoo & Rathindran, supra note 39, at 359.
166. Cortez, supra note 49, at 666-68.
167. McLean, supra note 33, at 601.
168. For discussion, see supra Part I.B.1.b.
169. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 41, at 45-46; Howze, supra note 23, at 1026-29.
170. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 41, at 49 ("If the United States were to ignore the issue
of medical tourism, only injury, physically and financially, will result."); Howze, supra note
23, at 1050-52 ("Medical tourism is a symptom of a system that is broken and in need of
repair. It is not a cure.").
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Critical analysts have identified and focused on several quality of
care issues unique to medical tourism. These issues include a medical
tourist's difficulty in obtaining proper pre-operative"' or post-
operative care,172 increased risk of adverse surgical outcomes due to
risky post-operative behavior,173 more difficult recovery due to
prolonged separation from family, friends, and familiar physicians,174
and engagement in "thoughtless surgery." 7 5
Though these considerations may create additional risks for
medical tourists, these concerns are not as compelling as critics assert.
For example, the contention that taking a medical tourist away from
his family physician creates additional risks for him ignores the simple
reality that many Americans lack a primary care physician at all, 7
and even those who have a long-standing physician relationship
typically are not treated surgically by that physician.'77  Other
concerns may be addressed by medical tourism providers or third-
party brokers hired to book medical tourist itineraries. Such brokers
are often instrumental in ensuring that a patient's medical tourism
facility is provided with all necessary medical history prior to surgery
and facilitating phone or email communication between the medical
tourist and her surgeon in order to ensure greater continuity of
care.' In addition, medical tourism facilities have attempted to
171. Cortez, supra note 14, at 103-04.
172. See, e.g., Howze, supra note 23, at 1029; Klaus, supra note 8, at 226-27. According
to this reasoning, American physicians may be reluctant to step in to remedy care
provided by another doctor and thereby risk being held liable for the malpractice of the
overseas physician. Howze, supra note 23, at 1028. Such follow-up care may also add
unexpected costs to medical tourists' total fees, since insurance is unlikely to pay for these
procedures. See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 14, at 104; Howze, supra note 23, at 1029.
173. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 41, at 45; Howze, supra note 23, at 1028-29. These
critics worry that such risky behavior may be encouraged to a certain extent by the
medical tourism brokers who arrange trips or by the websites medical tourists use to learn
about and schedule their overseas care. E.g., Boyle, supra note 41, at 45-46.
174. See Boyle, supra note 41, at 46; Howze, supra note 23, at 1026; Parsiyar, supra
note 13, at 389.
175. Howze, supra note 23, at 1027-28; Klaus, supra note 8, at 240-42. "Thoughtless
surgery" refers to elective procedures chosen by a patient for their reduced cost and
package deals with an exotic vacation, before the patient has adequately considered their
inherent risks. See Klaus, supra note 8, at 240.
176. See generally NAT'L ASS'N OF CMTY. HEALTH CTRS. & THE ROBERT GRAHAM
CrR., ACCESS DENIED: A LOOK AT AMERICA'S MEDICALLY DISENFRANCHISED (2007)
(providing statistics on the shortage of primary care physicians in the United States).
177. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2010-11
Edition: Physicians and Surgeons, U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, 1-2, http://www.bls.gov/oco/
pdflocos074.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2011) (describing the distinct roles of primary care
physicians and surgeons).
178. See WOODMAN, supra note 7, at 46-48; Klaus, supra note 8, at 228.
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address many common patient concerns, for example, by improving
the access of patients to their family and friends during their
treatment periods. 179
. Furthermore, many of these considerations are distinguishable
from more traditional quality of care concerns because they are much
more easily controlled by the patient himself. By taking additional
precautions in preparing for his medical tourism experience, the
patient can largely mitigate the risks underlying these concerns. 80
Though medical tourism may require patients to take a slightly more
hands-on approach to fully safeguard their health following surgery,
patients who are adequately informed about these issues before they
engage in medical tourism will be much less vulnerable to its
limitations than critics assert.
Perhaps more importantly, many critics of medical tourism
assume an American-centered view of quality health care, retaining
underlying assumptions about the quality of the U.S. health care
system and basing their comparisons of medical tourism's quality on a
hypothetical "gold standard."' Such assumptions, however, have
been called into question in recent years through increasingly in-
depth investigation of American health care quality. According to a
World Health Organization report, the United States ranks first
among nations in medical expenditures, but only thirty-seventh
overall in the quality of care delivered by its domestic health care
system.182 Moreover, a report published in 2000 by the Institute of
Medicine reported that as many as 98,000 Americans are killed by
179. For example, facilities typically will provide living arrangements for the patient's
caretaker, which allow the caretaker to remain in the hospital with the patient during her
stay. See, e.g., International Patient Services: Category of Rooms Apollo Hospitals New
Delhi, APOLLO HOSPS., http://www.apollohospitals.com/categorydelhi.php (last visited
Jan. 3, 2011). Bumrungrad International Hospital also provides a "virtual patient visit"
website which allows the patient and her network of family and friends to exchange
messages and pictures during the patient's stay. Klaus, supra note 8, at 228. Thus, receiving
care abroad does not necessarily remove a medical tourist from the comforts of her family
and friends.
180. For example, patients can control their post-operative itinerary and flight schedule
in order to reduce the risk of adverse post-operative effects. Even delaying their return by
a few days or weeks, for example, might significantly reduce the risk of surgical
complications, and most medical tourists choose to extend their stay by this length of time.
Boyle, supra note 41, at 45; Klaus, supra note 8, at 227. Similarly, medical tourists may be
less likely to engage in thoughtless surgery if more fully and forcefully informed of the
risks inherent in any surgical procedure.
181. See, e.g., Brady, supra note 16, at 1096-97 (describing the lack of empirical
comparability between U.S. and foreign providers and casting inherent surgical risk as "a
dark pall over medical standards abroad," but not domestically).
182. WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 155,200 (2000).
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medical errors each year, making medical error the eighth leading
cause of death at that time.' Since this report was published, the
federal government has increased efforts to protect patient safety and
reduce medial errors." Despite efforts of the Agency for Healthcare
Research & Quality ("AHRQ") and others to collect data on health
care quality and enhance patient care,'18 quality improvements since
2000 have been slow, 186 and quality of care has continued to vary
substantially across state lines."' Further improvements in the U.S.
health care system, particularly in reducing medical errors, have been
hampered in part by the nature of its compliance system. The federal
government and most states neither require reporting by hospitals of
adverse patient events nor mandate that the Joint Commission
release information it collects to the public."' As previously
183. INST. OF MED., supra note 120, at 26. More than two-thirds of the errors analyzed
in this report were believed to be preventable, and many of these may have been
attributable to negligence. Id. at 36.
184. See Lucian L. Leape & Donald M. Berwick, Five Years After to Err is Human:
What Have We Learned?, 293 JAMA 2384, 2385 (2005) (recognizing that Congress
appropriated $50 million annually to patient safety research and named the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality as the lead research organization for federal patient
safety research).
185. For discussion, see supra notes 119-22.
186. NATIONAL HEALTHCARE QUALITY REPORT 2007, supra note 118, at iv, 2
(revealing annual improvement of only 1.5% between 2000 and 2005). This modest change
was calculated based on a subset of "core measures" intended to represent the most
important and well-supported measures in the study; these include such varied indicators
as breast cancer incidence, childhood vaccinations, and surgical post-operative
complications. See id. at 11, 13-16.
187. Id. at iv, 3, 5.
188. See FIELD, supra note 135, at 47; JOINT COMM'N, supra note 150, at ACC-54, SE-
1, PI-9. Medical errors are addressed in the United States primarily through voluntary
reporting mechanisms authorized by the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 299b-21 to -26 (2006). Though some states have mandatory reporting
requirements for adverse events and medical errors, this is far from the general rule, as
many states allow hospitals to choose the extent to which they will report such events. See
supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text. To assuage providers' fears of legal reprisal for
their errors, the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act places significant limitations
on how this information may be used or disclosed, including comprehensive confidentiality
and government privilege for voluntarily reported patient safety data. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22;
FIELD, supra note 135, at 47. No facility under the federal regime is required to report on
any adverse events that occur within their facilities, FIELD, supra note 135, at 47, and
continuing fear of litigation may prevent providers from making these data available. See
id.; NATIONAL HEALTHCARE QUALITY REPORT 2007, supra note 118, at 8. Though the
Joint Commission accreditation assesses hospitals on the quality of their adverse event
records and encourages reporting of particularly harmful "sentinel events," these
behaviors are not required for accreditation, and the Joint Commission generally does not
release any information collected to the public or government. See JOINT COMM'N, supra
note 150, at ACC-54, SE-1, PI-9. A "sentinel event" is defined as "an unexpected
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discussed, limited data exist with which to compare American and
international medical care qualitatively.'"1 However, several general
observations are appropriate for common medical tourism
destinations. First, medical tourists' reports of the quality of their care
are vastly positive in nature." Though specific instances of poor
quality have been noted, with painful results for the unfortunate
recipients of this care,'91 such instances appear to stem primarily from
the use of "unaccredited hospitals and unlicensed providers."'92 Of
course, all medical procedures carry certain inherent risk,' 9' and even
careful doctors are fallible people. However, because medical tourism
represents a more substantial break from the "status quo" of
American medical care, medical tourists may be more likely to
choose practitioners based on negative reports against a particular
international provider than the average American patient receiving
care from local practitioners.194 The medical tourism industry
therefore provides a stronger incentive to provide high-quality care
than most American facilities. Furthermore, the JCI may provide
additional means of keeping medical tourism facilities in check,
beyond the role played by the Joint Commission in regulating
American medical care. In determining whether to grant
accreditation, the JCI evaluates the adequacy of a facility's quality of
care data collection and analysis, as well as steps taken to ensure
continuous quality and safety improvement.195 In addition, the JCI
has expressed a commitment to publicizing standard-specific scores
for the facilities it accredits.196 Though only a rough proxy for actual
error reporting, publicizing scores on these safety measures would
give medical tourists a better understanding of the safety measures in
occurrence involving death or serious physical or psychological injury, or the risk thereof."
Id. at SE-1.
189. See supra Part I.B.1.a.
190. Howze, supra note 23, at 1030; see supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
191. E.g., Terry, supra note 7, at 464 (quoting Medical Tourism Hearing, supra note 17,
at 45 (statement of Bruce Cunningham, M.D., President, American Society of Plastic
Surgeons)).
192. Id.
193. Brady, supra note 16, at 1097.
194. See BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 60, 145. The effects of reputation on
medical tourism facilities are discussed in greater detail infra Part III.A.1.
195. JoINT COMM'N INT'L, supra note 119, at 102-09.
196. Id. at 8. The JCI will provide this information "[w]hen a sufficient database of
accredited organizations is available for a comparative report .... " Id. Ensuring that the
JCI adheres to this commitment may be an important part of ensuring transparency in the
medical tourism market and thereby protecting American medical tourists. See infra Part
III.B.
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place and provide additional incentive for facilities to implement and
follow these safety procedures.
Given the most comprehensive comparison of American and
medical tourism facilities currently possible, medical tourists appear,
at the very least, to be no worse off than American patients in the
quality and safety of care they receive abroad. Though this section
has focused largely on the limitations and regulatory pitfalls in the
United States, it should not be construed to suggest that increased
regulation of the American health care system would not be
preferable if effective in ensuring better patient outcomes. If the
United States were to establish more effective standards to ensure
quality of care that far surpassed the effectiveness of measures
available overseas, increased regulation of medical tourism might be
warranted. Until the United States is able to regulate its own medical
quality more uniformly and effectively, however, restricting access to
overseas medical treatment based on quality of care issues is unduly
protectionist and hypocritical.
2. Access to Legal Remedy
Another criticism leveled against medical tourism is the lack of
legal remedy for patients claiming injury from medical malpractice.197
Some errors are inevitable in any health care system; no matter how
scientifically advanced or carefully administered the treatment, health
care professionals are ultimately human, and even good doctors make
mistakes.198 When medical tourists become the victims of medical
malpractice, they will likely face high recovery costs on their return to
the United States, as even insured individuals will be unlikely to
obtain coverage for injuries incurred through out-of-network
procedures.199 Analysts universally agree that injured American
medical tourists lack any viable means of legal recourse remotely akin
to the U.S. civil court system.20 0 As one popular medical tourism
facility has conceded, "[t]here is presently no international legal
197. E.g., Howze, supra note 23, at 1029-38; Mirrer-Singer, supra note 16, at 212-27;
Parsiyar, supra note 13, at 393-96.
198. See JACK HASSON & RAZI SHARAFIEH, WHY EVEN GOOD DOCTORS MAKE
MISTAKES: AN ANECDOTAL INTRODUCTION TO MEDICINE 8 (2005) (describing the
imperfection of medicine and the varied types of mistakes that even vigilant doctors
make).
199. Boyle, supra note 41, at 45; Howze, supra note 23, at 1029 (citing Medical Tourism
Hearing, supra note 17, at 46 (statement of Bruce Cunningham, M.D., President,
American Society of Plastic Surgeons)).
200. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 41, at 46; Brady, supra note 16, at 1100-02; Howze,
supra note 23, at 1029-38; Parsiyar, supra note 13, at 395-96.
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regulation of medical tourism.... The issue of legal recourse for
unsatisfactory treatment across international boundaries is a legally
undefined issue at present."201
Medical tourists' lack of legal recourse stems from several
sources. As a threshold matter, medical tourism facilities may require
patients to take steps to limit their legal remedy against the
provider.202 Medical tourists must generally sign away any rights to
sue for malpractice when they seek medical care in Asian facilities.203
In refusing to recognize such waivers as valid,20 American courts
have tended to base their decisions on the dual grounds that health
care providers supply services in the "public interest," and that
patients lack the ability to bargain on equal terms with health care
providers.205 In contrast, because most international jurisdictions do
not adhere as strongly to similar rationales, 206 they may be more
willing to recognize the validity of malpractice waivers.207 Foreign
judges may be further encouraged to uphold malpractice waivers as a
protectionist measure to safeguard the foreign jurisdiction's domestic
health care industry, particularly the fledgling medical tourism
industry. Thus, such waivers may provide a strong disincentive for
medical tourists to sue.
Second, the U.S. legal system is unlikely to provide an adequate
means of legal redress against foreign providers. 208 Most patients
would prefer to file a lawsuit close to home and in a familiar
jurisdiction, and medical tourists may attempt to sue their foreign
201. Mirrer-Singer, supra note 16, at 212 (quoting Medical Insurance India,
INDIAPROFILE.COM, http://www.indiaprofile.com/medical-tourism/medical-insurance-and-
legal-aspects.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2011)).
202. See Brady, supra note 16, at 1100; Klaus, supra note 8, at 235.
203. Brady, supra note 16, at 1100; Klaus, supra note 8, at 235.
204. See Maxwell J. Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting: Limitations on Bargaining
Between Patients and Health Care Providers, 51 U. PiTn. L. REV. 365, 401-04 (1990).
205. See id. at 401-03. These rationales draw heavily on the implied assumption that
malpractice suits are necessary to protect the welfare of patients and to safeguard the
public health, which is also used to justify the breadth and pervasiveness of medical
malpractice litigation in the United States. See Klaus, supra note 8, at 235-39.
206. See Parsiyar, supra note 13, at 395 ("[O]ther countries are not as litigious as the
United States.").
207. Theoretically, many developing countries have adopted policies protective of their
emerging medical tourism industries in other contexts. See BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN,
supra note 7, at 70-74 (describing the active role of the public sector in promoting medical
tourism in destination countries).
208. For a comprehensive article addressing this topic, see Mirrer-Singer, supra note 16
(discussing many of the theories by which medical tourists attempt to bring claims in
American courts against foreign health care providers).
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provider in the U.S. court system.2 09 However, an American court
must have personal jurisdiction over the foreign provider before
recognizing the suit, a burden which would be difficult for the medical
tourist to meet.210 American courts appear extremely reluctant to
assert personal jurisdiction over nonresident doctors who do not
practice in the forum state.211 It could be difficult to establish
minimum contacts sufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction,
particularly over a physician who conducted a harmful procedure
outside the forum state's borders.212 In some instances, minimum
contacts may be established when a plaintiff conducts business over
the Internet.213 However, American courts have been reluctant to find
that the mere operation of a website is sufficient to meet the
minimum contacts requirement, particularly in the few cases
addressing medical websites. 214 Furthermore, courts are unlikely to
recognize the alternative argument of "continuing tort," which would
209. See, e.g., Howze, supra note 23, at 1032; Mirrer-Singer, supra note 16, at 212-13;
Parsiyar, supra note 13, at 393.
210. Mirrer-Singer, supra note 16, at 212-13.
211. Id. at 213; see, e.g., Harris v. Omelon, 985 A.2d 1103, 1107 (D.C. 2009) (finding no
personal jurisdiction over a Virginia physician who merely phoned a prescription into the
forum state); Bachman v. Med. Engineering Corp., 724 P.2d 858, 860-61 (Or. Ct. App.
1986) (recognizing no personal jurisdiction in Oregon over Washington physicians who
allegedly practiced negligently on the defendant in Washington and whose contacts with
Oregon included several Oregon patients and sporadic supervision of Oregon surgeons);
Grove v. Maheswaran, 498 S.E.2d 485, 491 (W. Va. 1997) (failing to find sufficient
minimum contacts to establish jurisdiction over a nonresident physician).
212. See Harris, 985 A.2d at 1106-07; Bachman, 724 P.2d at 860-61; Howze, supra note
23, at 1031-32; Mirrer-Singer, supra note 16, at 212-13.
213. See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 713-14
(4th Cir. 2002) (holding that, in Maryland courts, "specific jurisdiction in the Internet
context may be based only on an out-of-state person's Internet activity directed at
Maryland and causing injury that gives rise to a potential claim cognizable in Maryland");
Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 2002 FED App. 0080P at 10, 282 F.3d 883, 890-
91 (6th Cir. 2002) (suggesting that "[s]everal aspects of the [defendant's] website ...
support a finding of purposeful availment"-including granting passwords to forum state
residents, soliciting forum state businesses, and posting study data held out as collected
from forum state residents); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119,
1123-27 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (applying the widely adopted test for minimum Internet
contacts).
214. See, e.g., Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 ("A passive Web site that does little more
than make information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction."); Zavala v. El Paso Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 2007-NMCA-149,
20, 143 N.M. 36, 172 P.3d 173 (finding that a hospital's "[e]stablishment of a passive
website that can be viewed internationally is not sufficient to support general personal
jurisdiction absent some showing that the website targeted" the forum state); Schexnayder
v. Daniels, 187 S.W.3d 238, 249 (Tex. App. 2006) (finding no personal jurisdiction based
on hospital website providing defendant-physician's credentials and email interaction);
McLean, supra note 33, at 634-35.
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allow the court to assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign physician
merely because his tortuously-rendered care continues to harm the
plaintiff within the forum state.215
Medical tourists who procured care through the use of a medical
tourism broker might alternatively attempt to sue the broker, rather
than the physician.2 16 Brokerage firms incorporated in the United
States may provide easier means of establishing personal jurisdiction,
as they will always fall within the jurisdiction of their principal place
of business and their state of incorporation.2 17 However, this remedy
would only aid those medical tourists who employed brokers to
arrange their travel and medical plans and not those who arranged
travel through other means. Even if personal jurisdiction is
established over a broker, medical tourists are unlikely to prevail
because the broker's relationship to any one provider is unlikely to
justify a finding of actual or proximate causation or to establish
vicarious liability for the provider's actions.2 18
In either case, conflict of laws issues will further reduce a medical
tourist's likelihood of recovery in a malpractice suit.219 If personal
jurisdiction is established and a court recognizes a valid claim against
the defendant, the defendant likely will be successful in challenging
the suit's location through a forum non conveniens motion.2 20 If an
215. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Huffman, 609 N.E.2d 321, 324-35 (Ill. 1993); Mirrer-
Singer, supra note 16, at 214. This is attributable in part to the policy implications of the
theory's potential application to American physicians; a continuing tort theory has been
rejected in the medical malpractice context in a number of American jurisdictions when it
is based only on a continued harm to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Canas v. Al-Jabi, 639 S.E.2d
494, 508-09 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006), rev'd on other grounds, Kaminer v. Canas, 653 S.E.2d
691, 691 (Ga. 2007); In re Moses, 2000-2643, p. 8 (La. 5/25/01); 788 So. 2d 1173, 1183;
Stanbury v. Bacardi, 953 S.W.2d 671, 676-77 (Tenn. 1997); see also Aristide v. Jackson
Mem'l. Hosp., 917 So. 2d 253, 255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) ("No Florida appellate court
has applied the continuing tort doctrine to medical malpractice cases."). Some
jurisdictions recognize an alternate "continuing treatment" theory, under which a patient
may recover for injuries sustained through a course of treatments or a continued
physician-patient relationship over time. See, e.g., Beckel v. Gerber, 1998 SD 48, 1 10, 578
N.W.2d 574, 576. Even where this doctrine is recognized, however, it would be unlikely to
apply to a medical tourist's injury, as the opportunity for continued treatment or
continued relationship with the foreign physician is unlikely.
216. Mirrer-Singer, supra note 16, at 216.
217. Id.
218. See id. at 216-21.
219. See id. at 222-27.
220. Howze, supra note 23, at 1032; Mirrer-Singer, supra note 16, at 222, 224. The
forum non conveniens doctrine allows a court to decline to exert jurisdiction when the
plaintiff's chosen forum would pose an undue burden or hardship on the defendants, as is
often the case when the defendant is a foreign national. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501, 507-09 (1947). Removal may be denied if it would effectively prevent the
defendant from receiving "reasonable access to some legal remed[y]." Mirrer-Singer,
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American jurisdiction were to hear the medical tourist's lawsuit, most
jurisdictions would apply the law of the country in which the
malpractice occurred, which would decrease the likelihood of a
finding of malpractice and reduce damage awards.22 1 Finally, if a
medical tourist is successful in winning a monetary judgment in her
favor, obtaining enforcement of this judgment over a foreign provider
is likely to be difficult.2 22
Even if relief is not barred by either waiver or lack of legal
remedy, suing for malpractice in an international jurisdiction may not
be economically prudent or feasible for medical tourists.223 The
United States is a more plaintiff-friendly jurisdiction than foreign
countries, providing a civil court system, which is generally more
efficient and produces larger damage awards and settlements than
foreign jurisdictions. 224 Furthermore, malpractice law in other nations
is not as protective of patients, or even as clearly defined, as U.S.
medical malpractice law.2 25 Foreign jurisdictions may be reluctant to
supra note 16, at 223 (quoting Jeha v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 751 F. Supp. 122, 125 (S.D.
Tex. 1990)); see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981); Howze, supra note
23, at 1033-34. However, because American courts typically are unwilling to pass
judgment on the adequacy of international tribunals, they are more likely to recognize the
foreign jurisdiction in which the surgery took place as the appropriate forum for the suit.
See Howze, supra note 23, at 1035-36; Mirrer-Singer, supra note 16, at 224. On the other
hand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas
Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220 (3d Cir. 1995), refused to release a civil suit to the Indian courts on
forum non conveniens grounds, citing the remote possibility of recovery and significant
delay in that jurisdiction as evidence that the forum was inadequate. Id. at 1224; see
Mirrer-Singer, supra note 16, at 224. This fact suggests that, should personal jurisdiction
over a foreign provider be recognized, a medical tourist plaintiff may not be precluded
from access to the traditional American malpractice recovery, particularly if the suit is
brought within this circuit.
221. E.g., Chadwick v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 656 F. Supp. 857, 858 (D. Del. 1987)
(dismissing malpractice action against oil company incorporated in Delaware, with its
principal place of business in Saudi Arabia, where defendant was misdiagnosed in Saudi
Arabia and Saudi law did not recognize liability); see Mirrer-Singer, supra note 16, at 226-
27.
222. See ROBERT E. LUTZ, A LAWYER'S HANDBOOK FOR ENFORCING FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD 415-37 (2007) (describing the
difficulties encountered in enforcing American judgments in foreign nations).
223. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 41, at 46; Howze, supra note 23, at 1035-36.
224. See BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 156; Boyle, supra note 41, at 46;
Howze, supra note 23, at 1030, 1034-35; Parsiyar, supra note 13, at 395.
225. See Howze, supra note 23, at 1034-35; Klaus, supra note 8, at 236; Parsiyar, supra
note 13, at 395. For example, approximately ninety-five percent of malpractice cases in
India are dismissed, and those that survive dismissal must face substantial delays before
the case is heard in court. Howze, supra note 23, at 1034-35. Similarly, most Asian
countries lack consistent-and regularly enforced-malpractice standards. Klaus, supra
note 8, at 236. Cuba does not allow patients to sue doctors for malpractice at all. Parsiyar,
supra note 13, at 395.
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recognize even valid malpractice claims by foreign patients against
domestic providers because doing so would create unfavorable
precedent encouraging similar suits and potentially harm their
medical tourism industry. Thus, even assuming a medical tourist
would be successful in having her malpractice suit heard in a foreign
jurisdiction, the small and uncertain damage award, coupled with the
significant expense of conducting a protracted trial overseas, makes
any lawsuit financially infeasible.226 When faced with the slim chance
of success and strong possibility of losing money in pursuing a
malpractice recovery, medical tourists lack incentive to pursue their
claims abroad.
Despite the lack of an effective legal remedy for medical tourists,
the fact that plaintiffs who have received negligent medical treatment
abroad do not have access to remedies akin to those offered by the
American malpractice system is unlikely to harm medical tourists as
much as critics of the practice suggest.227 According to prevailing
American legal theory, medical malpractice is a beneficial component
of the U.S. health care system justified by the advancement of three
primary policy goals: (1) compensation for the costs of patients'
injuries; (2) deterrence of future negligence; and (3) punishment of
negligent practitioners.2 8 However, even within the American tort
system, these justifications do not appear to be served in practice.
Malpractice recoveries in the United States provide
compensation not only for direct costs of the patient's injury, but also
for its indirect costs, in an attempt to make the patient whole after his
injury.229 This form of redress tends to be much more extensive than
in foreign nations, where damages may be limited to direct costs. 230
The American tort system, however, does not work consistently to
provide redress for all, or even a majority of all patients harmed by
provider negligence. 231 An estimated two percent of negligent medical
226. See Howze, supra note 23, at 1035.
227. See, e.g., Mirrer-Singer, supra note 16, at 228-32; Parsiyar, supra note 13, at 395-
96.
228. See David M. Studdert et al., Medical Malpractice, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 283, 283
(2004).
229. See id. ("[T]he party at fault for an injury should bear the associated costs,
including lost earnings, medical bills, and 'pain and suffering.' ").
230. See BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 156.
231. See A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse
Events Due to Negligence, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 245, 249 (1991) ("[Tlhe number of
patients in New York State who have serious, disabling injuries each year as a result of
clearly negligent medical care but who do not file claims (5400) exceeds the number of
patients making malpractice claims (3570).").
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injuries result in a claim against the negligent provider.232 Only a
portion of these claims result in restitution for the injured plaintiff,233
and only a limited portion of litigation expenditures actually benefit
injured plaintiffs.234 Some analysts also have argued that those who
are able to recover tend to be overcompensated, for example through
excessive recoveries for pain and suffering.235 These additional
expenses, coupled with the substantial administrative costs incurred
by the system at large, are passed off to all patients in the form of
higher costs for medical care.236 Although the malpractice system is
justified for its ability to compensate some injured patients for their
injuries, it is ineffective in achieving this goal for the majority of
injured patients and tends to impose additional costs and reduce
access to care for all patients.
The deterrent effect of tort liability also remains questionable. In
theory, practitioners who are forced to pay high damage awards and
whose reputations are harmed by a malpractice claim will be less
likely to provide poor care in the future.237 Moreover, the medical
community may look to those physicians as a reminder of the
potential consequences of negligent care and be encouraged to act
with greater care to avoid a similar fate. 238 There is little concrete
evidence, however, that the threat of a medical malpractice action
effectively deters practitioners from future negligence. 239 The threat
232. Studdert et al., supra note 228, at 285; see Localio et al., supra note 231, at 247,
249; see also H.H. Hiatt et al., A Study of Medical Injury and Medical Malpractice: An
Overview, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 480, 480-81 (1989) (describing the methods of an
empirical study of the compensation that patients with medically caused injuries receive,
and the degree to which the threat of malpractice suits limits injuries).
233. See David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2031 (2006) (finding that
approximately one-sixth of all legitimate claims of medical negligence which were fully
litigated failed to result in a recovery for the plaintiff).
234. Id. (finding that approximately fifty to sixty percent of all money spent on medical
malpractice is used to cover litigation expenses and not to compensate meritorious
plaintiffs).
235. See HARRIS, supra note 124, at 252. But see Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know
Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 1147, 1271-80 (1992) (arguing that people with relatively small losses tend to be
overcompensated, while those whose losses are large tend to be undercompensated).
236. See HARRIS, supra note 124, at 252; Klaus, supra note 8, at 235.
237. See Studdert et al., supra note 228, at 283; Klaus, supra note 8, at 236; see also
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26-
28, 73-75 (1970) (exploring the deterrent effect of tort liability).
238. See Studdert et al., supra note 228, at 283; Brady, supra note 16, at 1100; Klaus,
supra note 8, at 236.
239. Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory
and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1607-08 (2002); Studdert et
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of a lawsuit may actually result in adverse behaviors by practitioners,
as they may be encouraged to engage in "defensive medicine" by
ordering additional tests and procedures in order to ward off future
malpractice claims.240 In contrast, medical tourism providers may be
effectively deterred from acting negligently without the need for
malpractice liability, since the viability of a medical tourism facility is
based in large part on its ability to maintain a reputation for quality,
safe, and efficient service, which allows it to compete more effectively
with other medical tourism destinations. 241
The American medical malpractice system also fails to punish
physicians effectively for negligent harm to patients. Malpractice suits
impose certain "reputational and emotional harm[s]" on
defendants,242 as well as considerable hassle. However, due to the
relative infrequency of malpractice suits, 243 coupled with the fact that
practitioners tend not to experience major professional consequences
unless they are sued routinely,24 these harms may amount to a mere
inconvenience, insufficiently persuasive to redress the plaintiff's
harms or to deter future negligence.245
Monetary judgments against a provider are a potentially harsher
punishment. However, payment mechanisms for these judgments
produce an unintended removal of responsibility from physicians for
their negligent acts. Expensive malpractice insurance has become a
practical requirement for physicians practicing in the United States.246
When a physician loses a malpractice suit, his insurance company will
al., supra note 228, at 286; Brady, supra note 16, at 1100-01; Klaus, supra note 8, at 236. A
number of studies examining the relationship between medical malpractice and reduced
medical error have returned, at best, inconclusive evidence of deterrence. See Studdert et
al., supra note 228, at 286; Klaus, supra note 8, at 236.
240. See HARRIS, supra note 124, at 252; Studdert et al., supra note 228, at 286. This
practice is detrimental to patients: As increasing numbers of procedures become standard
patient care, routine patient care is ratcheted up in the amount of time and cost each
patient consumes, Studdert et al., supra note 228, at 286, increasing the burden on
providers and reducing the quality of care delivered for all patients. Providing more
treatment than is necessary may also result in adverse effects for the patient, resulting
even more directly in reduced quality of care for the patients. See NAT'L COMM. FOR
QUALITY ASSURANCE, supra note 119, at 9.
241. See Klaus, supra note 8, at 236-37. The effects of competition on medical tourism
facilities' quality of care is discussed in greater detail infra Part III.A.1.
242. Klaus, supra note 8, at 239.
243. See Studdert et al., supra note 233, at 2025.
244. See Studdert et al., supra note 228, at 283-84; Klaus, supra note 8, at 238-39.
245. HARRIS, supra note 124, at 253; see Studdert et al., supra note 228, at 283. But see
HARRIS, supra note 124, at 252 ("Even an unjustified claim can have an adverse effect on
a physician's professional reputation.").
246. See Studdert et al., supra note 228, at 283
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foot the bill while the cost of the insurance is passed on to all patients
in the form of higher fees for medical services. 247 Thus, it is the
insurance companies and (indirectly) the patients who are punished
financially for a physician's malpractice. Such a perverse system may
create moral hazard for some physicians, justifying inadequate
measures to avoid liability as physicians are forced to pay the high
costs of malpractice insurance regardless of these efforts.248
In contrast, physicians employed at medical tourism facilities are
likely to be punished more substantially for their negligence. The
reputations of these physicians are closely linked to their ability to
attract patients because medical tourists are encouraged to use the
reputation and history of a physician to enlist her services.249
Furthermore, the ability of physicians overseas to avoid expensive
malpractice insurance-and thereby avoid passing on the costs of this
insurance to patients-may be a substantial factor in ensuring the
reduced costs of medical tourists' procedures.250
Thus, the vast majority of American patients who choose to
engage in medical tourism will not be harmed by giving up their right
to sue, since the American malpractice system inadequately protects
the interests of most injured patients and may produce incidental
detriment to patient care. In contrast, the primary financial benefit of
medical tourism, as well as other incidental benefits to quality of care,
is likely to be promoted substantially by the absence of an American-
style malpractice system and the increased administrative and
insurance costs which such a system produces.
3. Conflict with ERISA
Poor quality of care and lack of medical malpractice remedy are
the two strongest arguments leveled against medical tourism, as these
247. See Klaus, supra note 8, at 237. Medical malpractice insurance premiums generally
are not "experience rated"; that is, they are not priced differently between individuals
based on their malpractice history. MICHELLE M. MELLO, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON
FOUND., UNDERSTANDING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: A PRIMER 1 (2006),
http://www.rwjf.org/pr/synthesis/reports-and-briefs/pdflnol0_primer.pdf. Thus, a
physician's malpractice insurance premium will not change, even if the insurance company
is forced to pay out a large damage award on the physician's behalf.
248. See William M. Sage, Medical Malpractice Insurance and the Emperor's Clothes,
54 DEPAUL L. REV. 463, 475-76 (2005).
249. Cortez, supra note 14, at 107; Brady, supra note 16, at 1102; Klaus, supra note 8, at
239.
250. Klaus, supra note 8, at 238. In most cases, physicians abroad will carry some form
of malpractice insurance, but because it may only be used to absorb the cost of a limited
judgment against the physician, the costs of this insurance will be much less and not as
impactful to the individual patient. See BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 156.
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have the potential to cause the most significant and lasting harm to
patients. As a secondary concern, however, medical tourism has been
challenged2 5' on the grounds that it violates the fiduciary duty
imposed by ERISA.252 ERISA is a federal law that imposes a set of
minimum standards on employee benefit plans, including health
insurance plans, and is intended to protect employees by ensuring
plans' basic fairness and financial stability.253 As a central component
of these standards, ERISA imposes fiduciary duties on those invested
with discretionary control or authority in the plan's management or
administrative decisions.254 Pursuant to this duty, an ERISA fiduciary
is held to a prudent person standard of care under which he is
required to "discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries" and must act for two
"exclusive purpose[s]": to provide benefits to the plan participants
and to defray reasonably the plan's administrative expenses.255
It has been argued recently that the fiduciary duty imposed
under ERISA is fundamentally inconsistent with the concept of
medical tourism.256 Specifically, this argument contends that health
insurance plans, employers, and health maintenance organizations
("HMOs") cannot authorize and pay for participants to engage in
medical tourism without violating their fiduciary duty of loyalty under
ERISA.257 Although the authorization of medical tourism does not
result in a de jure violation of ERISA fiduciary requirements, 25 8 it is
argued that the financial benefits of medical tourism, which inure
primarily to the benefit of plan sponsors, are so great that they must
necessarily overwhelm the sponsors' ability to evaluate the dangers
251. See Brady, supra note 16, at 1075.
252. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(2006).
253. § 1001(a).
254. § 1002(21)(A). This provision has been interpreted to preclude fiduciary duty for
individuals who carry out "purely ministerial" duties for the plan, a determination which is
highly fact-specific. Brady, supra note 16, at 1081.
255. § 1104(a)(1). The "prudent man standard" established under ERISA embodies
the requirement that the fiduciary must act "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence
under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and
with like aims." § 1104(a)(1)(B). Some courts have held that this standard imposes a more
stringent requirement on ERISA fiduciaries than is imposed on common law trust
fiduciaries. Reich v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 837 F. Supp. 1259, 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1993);
see Brady, supra note 16, at 1107.
256. See Brady, supra note 16, at 1075.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1109.
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inherent in medical tourism.259 According to this argument, the very
act of authorizing medical tourism in insurance plans necessarily
produces a de facto violation of ERISA's fiduciary duties.26 Further,
medical tourism defeats ERISA's public policy justification of
ensuring equity in the distribution of employee health benefits.261
This argument undervalues the full scope of ERISA's fiduciary
requirements and underestimates the role of the employee in
choosing to engage in medical tourism. Employers undoubtedly
cannot force employees to obtain medical care overseas without
breaching more substantial fiduciary requirements,262 but merely
authorizing plan participants to engage in medical tourism as one of
many treatment options removes the ultimate decision from the plan
sponsors. Because participants in ERISA plans are not fiduciaries
themselves,263 the patient's decision to choose an option offered under
that plan cannot be the basis of a breach of fiduciary duty.264
Although plan fiduciaries are required to act in the best interest of
the plan participants, they are also required to defray administrative
expenses wherever possible.2 65 Allowing plan participants to choose
259. See id. at 1110-11.
260. See id. at 1111.
261. See id.
262. See id. at 1111-12.
263. Id. at 1109; see Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(21)(A) (2006). Section 1002(21)(A) recognizes as a fiduciary any person who
exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting
management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting
management or disposition of its assets, ... renders investment advice for a fee or
other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other
property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or ... has any
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such
plan.
By definition, individuals acting in their capacity as plan participants do not carry the
degree of managerial discretion necessary to be defined as fiduciaries under the statute.
264. Brady, supra note 16, at 1109; see id. at 1107 (recognizing that plan administrators
are vested with substantial discretion despite their fiduciary duty, and conceding that "[a]s
long as a plan administrator acted in the sole interest of the beneficiaries when deciding to
utilize medical outsourcing in an employee benefit plan, such a decision apparently falls
within the scope of ERISA's fiduciary duty"). Though the author suggests that merely
offering medical tourism as an option violates the fiduciary duty, regardless of the
patient's decision making responsibility, id. at 1111-12, he relies in large part on the
substantial quality concerns and lack of legal remedy inherent in medical tourism in
reaching this determination, id., risks which this Comment argues are overestimated.
265. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2006).
ERISA imposes a duty not to misrepresent the plan and, in some jurisdictions, an
affirmative duty of disclosure to plan participants. Brady, supra note 16, at 1085-87. If a
plan administrator adheres to these duties in providing medical tourism options within
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to engage in medical tourism will accomplish this latter duty, and the
plan sponsor may be able to increase the benefit to plan participants
by sharing the cost savings with them.266 Moreover, reducing costs to
plan sponsors may be the only means by which some employers can
continue to afford to provide health care benefits to their
employees.267 Medical tourism thus may actually promote, rather than
hamper, ERISA's goal of providing health care benefits more
equitably. By relying too heavily on perceived failings in medical
tourism's regulation and quality, this de facto violation argument fails
to account for the fact that medical tourism has the potential to
benefit both plan participants and plan sponsors and thereby meet
both ERISA's legal requirements and the policy goals ERISA was
created to promote.
C. Recognizing the Trade-off
Despite its substantial benefits to American patients,268
particularly those placed in a vulnerable position by their lack of
adequate medical insurance,269 medical tourism presents patients with
a set of value judgments to be weighed in reaching the decision to
undertake medical care overseas.270 While medical tourism involves
some unique quality concerns, and overall quality may be difficult to
assess, these quality concerns appear to be no greater overall than
those already present in the U.S. health care system.271 Though
patients may assume more individual financial risk by obtaining care
overseas due to the lack of comparable malpractice remedies in
foreign jurisdictions, this risk may not be entirely different from the
risk imposed by the limitations of the American malpractice system.272
employee benefit packages, plan participants can make fully informed choices regarding
the option to engage in medical tourism, and this decision does not give rise to a breach of
fiduciary duty.
266. See McLean, supra note 33, at 600 (addressing the Blue Ridge Paper controversy,
discussed supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text, which provides a salient example of
both the draw of medical tourism for employers and the possibility of cost-sharing with
employees).
267. See Boyle, supra note 41, at 43; Brady, supra note 16, at 1103; Klaus, supra note 8,
at 243.
268. See supra Part I.A.
269. See supra Part I.A.1.
270. See Brady, supra note 16, at 1102 (describing the need for patients to "evaluate
and weigh" the various risks and benefits of medical tourism before engaging in the
practice).
271. See supra Part I.B.1.
272. See supra Part I.B.2.
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Ultimately, the determination of whether to engage in medical
tourism should be made by the individual patient based on his own
value determination and risk assessment. Certainly, some risk-averse
individuals will choose to operate within the current financial
constraints of the American health care system despite the possibility
for low-cost and high-quality care overseas. However, it is
inaccurate-and harmful to American patients generally-to assume
that the existence of any risks should preclude participation in the
benefits of this emerging industry. Medical tourism provides a crucial
opportunity for patients who require care and would otherwise be
unable to obtain it, and it gives many more patients the opportunity
to exercise additional autonomy and to save substantial sums while
obtaining care. In the face of these vital benefits, concerns about
quality of care and legal remedies appear less important and
unconvincing. On the whole, the risk-benefit analysis of medical
tourism weighs in favor of accepting it as a viable short-term
alternative to the American health care system by providing care
options to patients for whom the current system has failed.273 As long
as patients are adequately informed of the medical tourism industry's
possible risks, they should be free to choose, without substantial
interference, to take advantage of its benefits.
II. INEFFECTIVE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND PROPOSALS
In recognition of the risks inherent in medical tourism, a variety
of reform proposals have been suggested to curb what some critics
consider an inherently dangerous practice.274 Most of these proposals
build upon the existing regulatory framework used to police the U.S.
health care system, cobbling together a solution to weaknesses in the
domestic and international regulatory systems.275 However, as this
section will argue, neither the current structure of the U.S. health care
regulatory system, nor proposed methods of limiting medical tourism
among Americans, will be effective in reducing its risks or limiting its
scope. Furthermore, imposing substantial regulatory limitations on
medical tourism will likely lead to a reduction in its cost effectiveness,
and therefore its primary benefit, for American patients.
273. See Medical Tourism Hearing, supra note 17, at 5. Some commentators, while
recognizing the risks inherent in medical tourism, have reached similar conclusions. See,
e.g., Klaus, supra note 8, at 245-47; Parsiyar, supra note 13, at 403--04.
274. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 41, at 48-49; Brady, supra note 16, at 1112-14.
275. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 41, at 48-49; Brady, supra note 16, at 1112-14.
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A. Existing Regulatory Framework
1. Forms of Domestic Government Regulation
The U.S. health care system is regulated by a combination of
government agencies and non-governmental organizations, both
public and private.276 At the government level, both state and federal
lawmakers are responsible for ensuring the safety and quality of
domestic health care services.277 The government has three primary
means of regulating the domestic health care industry.27 8 First, it may
create laws that directly prohibit or mandate certain activities by
health care providers.279 Second, the government may recognize a civil
cause of action for particular provider actions, allowing injured
patients to sue providers for these breaches.280 Medical malpractice
suits for negligent care fall within this category. Third, the
government may use its status as a significant purchaser of health care
services through social programs such as Medicare and Medicaid as
well as state employee health plans, to contract for additional
protections and thereby impose requirements on providers who wish
to supply services to government plan beneficiaries.281
These three regulatory methods are generally ineffective to
police providers who operate on patients overseas. First, the United
States has no jurisdiction to create laws that establish criminal liability
for individuals who are not U.S. citizens and who are acting entirely
on foreign soil. 2 ' Even if, in rare instances, a foreign doctor could be
deemed to have engaged in the practice of medicine within the
United States without a license, American officials likely cannot
enforce domestic licensure requirements on foreign providers.283
276. See FIELD, supra note 135, at 9-11; HARRIS, supra note 124, at 45-51.
277. HARRIS, supra note 124, at 67-68.
278. Id. at 4-5.
279. Id. at 4. For example, state governments mandate licensure of doctors before they
are authorized to practice medicine within that state. FIELD, supra note 135, at 22-24;
HARRIS, supra note 124, at 4-5.
280. HARRIS, supra note 124, at 5.
281. Id.
282. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
283. To enforce domestic laws against foreign providers, the United States must
effectively serve the provider with process in his or her home country, extradite the
provider to the United States, and find personal jurisdiction over the provider in the U.S.
court system. McLean, supra note 33, at 632. Minimum contacts are not necessary to
establish personal jurisdiction if the state's criminal statute provides for extraterritorial
jurisdiction. Id. at 635. Most States will authorize extraterritorial jurisdiction for those
crimes "committed in whole or in part" within its territory, id. at 637 (quoting Hagseth v.
Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 385, 390 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)) (internal quotation marks
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Thus, direct legislation, including licensure, is not an effective means
of regulating providers in the medical tourism context. Second, as this
Comment has discussed, providing a cause of action against negligent
foreign providers is generally not effective to redress medical tourists
for the malpractice of these providers.28 Whether such causes of
action fail for lack of personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, or
choice of law conflicts,285 within the current judicial framework they
are likely to be so ineffective that they fail to provide a useful means
of regulating foreign providers.
Third, the government's status as a large-scale purchaser is
equally unlikely to regulate medical tourism. Both federal and state
governments have been reluctant to endorse medical tourism as a
means of obtaining health care under government-sponsored plans.
Federal programs such as Medicare and Medicaid refuse to pay for or
reimburse health care obtained overseas.286 Similarly, the states have
neither taken advantage of medical tourism, nor attempted to
regulate the practice as purchasers. Both the Colorado and West
Virginia state legislatures recently proposed legislation providing
incentives for state employees to elect overseas care in order to
reduce the cost of insuring these public employees.287 However,
neither plan provided substantive guidelines for ensuring quality of
care in the choice of overseas providers. The West Virginia bill
required only that the provider be JCI accredited,288 while the
omitted), a standard which likely could be met in the medical outsourcing context if a
provider's actions created criminal harm within a particular state. McLean, supra note 33,
at 635. Such was the outcome in Hagseth, in which a former Colorado doctor with no valid
medical license was found guilty of practicing medicine without a license in California
when he wrote a prescription through an online pharmacy which resulted in the patient's
suicide. Hagseth, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 385. Many countries are unlikely to extradite or to aid
in serving process on their citizens unless a citizen is charged with a capital crime, due to
the disruption extradition creates on domestic law and order and because extradition of
medical tourism providers would be contrary to economic policy. McLean, supra note 33,
at 632-33. Thus, licensure is not an effective means of regulation for medical tourism
providers.
284. See supra Part I.B.2.
285. See supra Part I.B.2.
286. E.g., Mattoo & Rathindran, supra note 39, at 360.
287. H.B. 07-1143, 66th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2007), http://www.leg
.state.co.us/CLICS/CLICS2007A/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/DA1B1F6E36E70CD687257251007B7
BAF?Open&file=1143_01.pdf; H.B. 2841, 2007 Leg., 2d Sess. (W. Va. 2007),
http://www.legis.state.wv.us/BillTextHTML/2007_SESSIONS/RS/Bills/hb2841 %20intr.h
tm; see also Brady, supra note 16, at 1104 (West Virginia); DELOITTE CTR. FOR HEALTH
SOLUTIONS, supra note 10, at 6 (Colorado and West Virginia).
288. H.B. 2841; see Brady, supra note 16, at 1104-05; DELOITTE CTR. FOR HEALTH
SOLUTIONS, supra note 10, at 6.
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Colorado bill lacked even this requirement.28 9 Neither state
successfully enacted the proposed legislation,2 90 due in part to political
resistance to government "outsourcing" of medical care to foreign
providers rather than the domestic markets.2 91 Thus, neither the
federal nor state governments are employing their significant clout as
health care purchasers to regulate medical tourism. In the rare
instances in which they have considered purchasing medical tourism
services, they have failed to place meaningful restrictions on
authorized providers.2" Because of the significant opposition to
government endorsement of medical tourism, they also appear
unlikely to do so in the near future.293
2. Additional Regulatory Methods for Foreign Providers
When addressing foreign actors, the federal government has
several additional methods it can employ to protect domestic health
care markets from international competition. 294 First, the United
289. H.B. 07-1143; see DELOITTE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, supra note 10, at 6.
290. DELOITTE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, supra note 10, at 6. The West Virginia
bill died in committee; the committee considering the Colorado bill postponed the bill
indefinitely. See Bill Status - 2007 Regular Session, W. VA. LEGISLATURE, http://www
.legis.state.wv.us/Bill Status/Bills history.cfm?input=2841&year=2007&sessiontype=RS&
btype=bill (last visited Jan. 3, 2011) (indicating the West Virginia bill died in committee);
Summarized History for Bill Number HBO7-1143, COLO. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.leg
.state.co.us/CLICS/CLICS2007A/csl.nsf/BillFoldersAll?OpenFrameSet (follow "House
Bills 1101-1150" under "Select Bill Range"; then follow "History" hyperlink for HBO7-
1143) (last visited Jan. 3, 2011) (indicating the Colorado bill was postponed indefinitely).
291. Analysts have also suggested that the bills likely failed to pass due to their
"aggressive ... financial incentives for patients and employers." DELOITTE CTR. FOR
HEALTH SOLUTIONS, supra note 10, at 6.
292. See id. at 6 (describing the contents of the two state bills, which included
substantial incentives for potential medical tourists but-besides JCI accreditation in West
Virginia-did not pose any restrictions on the overseas providers they were authorized to
employ).
293. See Brady, supra note 16, at 1105. But see DELOITTE CTR. FOR HEALTH
SOLUTIONS, supra note 10, at 6 (suggesting that the aggressive incentives in both bills
were a primary reason for their failure, and the bills might pass if these incentives were
watered down).
294. In contrast, state governments are ill-suited to regulate or influence foreign
providers. The police power of the states enables them to regulate health care within their
own borders but does not allow them to impose requirements on providers acting in other
states or foreign countries. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the
power to regulate international trade and commerce is specifically reserved for the federal
government under the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3, 10 ("The
Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations ... [and] To
define and punish ... Offences against the Law of Nations...."); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2,
cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties . . . ."). Were the federal government to delegate to the states the
power to police particular aspects of medical tourism taking place within their individual
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States may enter into multilateral agreements with other nations to
ensure the quality of goods and services traded between those
nations.295 Trade agreements are often employed when two or more
nations agree mutually to bind particular service sectors of their
economies to meet specified provisions.29 6 Theoretically, such
agreements could set minimum quality standards for medical care for
foreign nationals traveling either to the United States or to other
nations for treatment.297
The federal government has not yet employed such agreements
to ensure domestic health care quality;298 furthermore, multilateral
agreements are unlikely to be effective. The general purpose of
international law, and specifically trade agreements, is to enhance,
not impede, trade between nations.2 99 Trade agreements that attempt
borders, such as pre-operative or post-operative conferencing between medical tourists
and their surgical teams, inconsistent regulation and international policy would result.
Such action by the states, whether the result of congressional delegation or independent
state action, also may be invalid due to a " 'dormant' foreign relations power" under the
U.S. Constitution. See State Laws Affecting Foreign Relations-Dormant Federal Power
and Preemption, JUSTIA.COM US SUPREME COURT CTR., http://supreme.justia.com/
constitution/article-2/26-dormant-foreign-relations.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2011). Thus,
the federal government is unlikely to make such a delegation to the individual states.
295. Cf McLean, supra note 33, at 624-32 (discussing the General Agreement on
Trade Services of the World Trade Organization and the implications this instrument has
on nations that commit health care sectors to free trade, focusing primarily on the
implications for telemedicine). For example, the quality of imported products is often
regulated through the use of "technical barriers to trade," such as product standards and
other mandated quality regulations, which establish the precise characteristics and quality
assurance measures to which an imported product is required to adhere. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2010 REPORT ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 5
(2010), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/REPORT%200N%20TECHNICAL%20
BARRIERS%20TO%20TRADE%20FINALTO%20PRINTER%2025Mar09.pdf. The
technical barriers to trade of the United States are established through formal
agreements-multilaterally through the World Trade Organization Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade and bilaterally through free trade agreements with individual
trading partners. Id. at 9. Similar agreements theoretically could be used to establish
technical regulations on health care services traded between nations.
296. See, e.g., Leah Belsky et al., The General Agreement on Trade in Services:
Implications for Health Policymakers, HEALTH AFF., May-June 2004, at 137, 138
(describing promotion of free trade in services through the General Agreement on Trade
Services).
297. See McLean, supra note 33, at 628.
298. Cf Terry, supra note 7, at 467 ("International and regional trade agreements have
had little impact on core U.S. health care delivery compared, for example, to impacts on
environmental law and policy. In the long term this may change.").
299. See 149 CONG. REC. 19,429 (2003) (statement of Joseph E. Stiglitz, Professor of
Economics & Finance, Columbia Univ.) ("The purpose of trade agreements is to facilitate
trade, and to eliminate trade barriers among countries."); McLean, supra note 33, at 625.
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to place restrictions on foreign providers are viewed unfavorably, "
and the United States would be unlikely to persuade other nations to
restrict their domestic health care market simply to meet American
standards. Furthermore, utilizing the trade agreements that the
United States has already entered into could limit the federal
government's ability to regulate its domestic health care market. For
example, as a member of the World Trade Organization, the United
States is obligated, at least in part, to abide by the General
Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") when trading services
with other nations. 0' To the extent a nation has voluntarily dedicated
a service sector to the GATS, this multilateral agreement serves to
remove barriers to trade in that sector and to bind the committed
nation to permit access to foreign service providers.3 02 Because the
language of the GATS has been liberally construed, 03 health care
barriers could include overly burdensome physician licensure or
special privileges for "public monopolies" such as the Department of
Veterans Affairs. " Thus, the GATS could actually serve to limit the
domestic regulations which the United States has already put in place
to protect domestic patients. To date, the United States has not fully
committed its health care sector to the GATS, although it has
committed its health insurance sector.305 Furthermore, because of the
significant restructuring of the domestic health care market which
300. Cf McLean, supra note 33, at 625 ("[I]nternational law views licensure schemes
that attempt to circumscribe trade as an anathema.") (citation omitted).
301. See, e.g., Nicholas Skala, The Potential Impact of the World Trade Organization's
General Agreement on Trade in Services on Health System Reform and Regulation in the
United States, 39 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVICES 363, 365 (2009) (describing generally
member responsibilities after a nation's service sector has been voluntarily committed to
GATS schedule).
302. See McLean, supra note 33, at 628-29. The only exception to this rule allows a
state to erect barriers absolutely required to ensure the basic quality of service in a
particular sector. Id.
303. See Skala, supra note 301, at 369-71 (describing both the liberal interpretation
regarding commitment of activity to the GATS schedule of services and the impact of
domestic regulations associated with committed service).
304. See McLean, supra note 33, at 626, 630.
305. See Belsky et al., supra note 296, at 144 (stating that "the United States has agreed
to open the health insurance sector fully to foreign providers"); McLean, supra note 33, at
631 (stating that although some may believe that a fully committed health care sector is
not possible for the United States, this view point may be overly optimistic). But see Skala,
supra note 301, at 378-83 (suggesting the United States has dedicated portions of its health
care sector, specifically hospital services and health care facilities, to the GATS beyond
health insurance).
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may be required to comply fully with the GATS requirements, the
United States likely will be unwilling to do so in the future.o6
The U.S. government also may employ trade barriers to shield
the domestic health care market from foreign competition.3 07 Present
trade barriers specific to the health care industry include limitations
on transferring funds from Medicare or Health Savings Accounts and
expensive Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
("HIPAA") requirements on care providers.30 s No major U.S.
government-sponsored health plan currently allows plan participants
to use its funds for medical tourism procedures.3 09 Trade barriers can
also significantly impact the nation implementing them, as the nations
they affect could react with increased trade restrictions of their own,
in theory by impacting other markets as well as the industry in
question.310 Those nations investing heavily in a domestic medical
tourism market may be likely to respond negatively to the imposition
of trade barriers from the United States, in an attempt to protect their
306. But see McLean, supra note 33, at 631-32 (arguing that the United States may be
influenced into committing its health care sector by the promise of cheaper health care
overseas and the desire to benefit from expanding its capital markets to other nations).
307. See id. at 639. Such barriers typically operate by impeding either the import or
export of particular goods or services. Id.
308. Id. at 639-40. Preventing the transfer of government insurance funds to medical
tourists serves to raise the cost of foreign health care for patients who would otherwise
take advantage of medical tourism-as these patients are now forced to choose between
obtaining coverage under their health plans or paying for medical tourism out of pocket.
This, in turn, disincentivizes the purchase of overseas care for these patients. Similarly,
HIPAA compliance raises the cost of providing medical tourism options. See id.
Presumably, the facility passes the cost on to the patient. In either case, the cost of
obtaining medical tourism increases for patients, making patients less likely to engage in
the practice and, on the whole, reducing the frequency with which overseas medical care is
"imported" to American patients.
309. See, e.g., BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 152 ("Medicare and Medicaid
forbid reimbursement for medical procedures that have been performed abroad.")
(citation omitted). Note that there are limited exceptions under the Medicare program for
emergency medical services performed while traveling abroad and for individuals living
closer to a foreign hospital than a domestic hospital. Id. Neither of these exceptions would
apply to medical tourism as it has been defined in this Comment.
310. Cf Kishore Gawande, A Test of a Theory of Strategically Retaliatory Trade
Barriers, 64 S. ECON. J. 425, 445 (1997) (recognizing that bilateral nontariff trade barriers
have been shown to elicit retaliation, despite regulations promulgated both by the World
Trade Organization and under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which
explicitly prohibit such retaliatory responses); Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., World Trade Org.,
Address to the Peterson Institute for International Economics: Retreating from Market
Opening Is Not a Solution to the Economic Crisis (April 24, 2009), http://www.wto
.org/english/news-e/sppl elsppll22-e.htm (cautioning countries against trade barriers
because "setting up new barriers to trade will be seen as protectionism and will risk
retaliation from trade partners").
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nascent industry.311 Additionally, even effective trade barriers have
only limited ability to influence markets over the long-term, as
market forces typically operate to reduce the efficacy of such barriers
within a short time of their implementation. 12 Thus, trade barriers are
unlikely to work as an effective regulatory force to ensure quality
within the medical tourism industry.
3. Impact of the Health Care Lobby
Though not part of the regulatory framework per se, the strength
of the health care lobby in the United States is also worth noting.
Recent contentious elections and debate over health care reform
have brought to light substantial financial backing for the political
activities, both election contributions and lobbying, of the health care
industry in the United States.313 Because health care is a valuable
sector of the economy,3 14 health care and health insurance lobbyists
carry significant clout in both state and federal legislatures.315
Both health care providers and health insurance companies have
strong incentives to protect the domestic health care industry from
competition by foreign providers. Domestic health care providers lose
significant revenue when patients elect to receive expensive surgeries
overseas. A recent study by the Deloitte Center for Health Solutions
estimates that 2008 medical tourism expenditures represent "$15.9
billion in lost revenue for U.S. health care providers," a number that
is likely to increase significantly as the practice becomes more
311. See Howard Pack & Kamal Saggi, Is There a Case for Industrial Policy? A Critical
Survey, 21 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 268, 269 (2006) (describing the "infant
industry" theory-which argues that trade barriers are required to protect a nascent
industry from foreign competition so that it can develop-as "one of the oldest arguments
for trade protection and perhaps the only such argument that is not dismissed out of hand
by economists").
312. McLean, supra note 33, at 640-41.
313. See, e.g., Robert Steinbrook, Election 2008-Campaign Contributions, Lobbying,
and the U.S. Health Sector, 357 NEw ENG. J. MED. 736, 736-38 (2007) (describing election
contributions and lobbying resources of the health care sector).
314. See Health Care Costs: A Primer, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 1-2 (March
2009), http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7670 02.pdf (estimating that the health care
sector accounts for approximately one-sixth of total the U.S. gross domestic product).
315. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Health Sector Has Donated Millions to Lawmakers, WASH.
POST, Mar. 8, 2009, at A9, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/03/07/AR2009030701748.html (recognizing that "[t]he health-care sector has
long ranked with financial services and energy interests as one of the most powerful
political forces in Washington, and it spent nearly $1 billion on lobbying in the past two
years alone"); David D. Kirkpatrick, At State Level, Health Lobby Fights Change, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 29, 2009, at Al (detailing the efforts of health care industry lobbyists to affect
health care reform at the state level).
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widespread.3 16 Health insurance companies also stand to lose
substantial revenue as medical tourism becomes an increasingly
viable option for Americans seeking to avoid insurance costs on the
eve of the PPACA's implementation.31 7
Though insurance companies could preserve and even expand
their customer bases were they to provide cheaper medical tourism
options for those who could not otherwise afford their premiums,318
the close relationship such companies must preserve with domestic
providers will likely impede the feasibility of such plans. Any form of
legislation attempting to regulate Americans' medical tourism
consumption, short of complete protectionism of the domestic
market, could be viewed as an endorsement of the practice and
threatening to the domestic health care market. The health care and
insurance lobbies likely would oppose such legislation strongly. At
the very least, as the practice continues to grow in popularity among
American consumers, these lobbyists are likely to push for restrictive
measures to limit the ability of medical tourists to benefit from the
practice and further inhibit the effectiveness of government
regulatory efforts.
B. Other Proposals for Medical Tourism Reform
Proposals for medical tourism reform have relied primarily on
the current health care regulatory framework to establish means of
regulating and imposing substantial limitations on medical tourism.319
Most proposals have suggested some form of state or federal
legislation to provide monitoring of medical tourism activities and
mandate restrictions on the industry through the action of state or
federal agencies.320 For example, one scholarly proposal would
authorize employee health insurance plans to incorporate medical
tourism options only on the condition that they set aside a specified
percentage to be distributed to plan participants who are injured by
316. DELOITTE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, supra note 2, at 14-15.
317. See Klaus, supra note 8, at 244 (describing potential for individuals to forgo
purchasing "insurance and instead set aside cash in the event that a surgery is necessary").
318. Id.
319. See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 14, at 123-27 (describing the potential oversight of
medical tourism industry by the DHHS); Boyle, supra note 41, at 48-49 (describing the
potential delegation by the federal government to states of the power to oversee medical
tourism); Brady, supra note 16, at 1112-13 (describing the potential regulation of medical
tourism through congressional action that regulates insurance providers and preserves
their fiduciary responsibility in this context).
320. See sources cited supra note 317.
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medical malpractice abroad.3 2 ' Another proposal would provide the
Department of Health and Human Services with authority to require
licensure of domestic entities such as medical tourism brokerage
firms, insurance companies, and travel agents who arrange for
medical tourists' care overseas.322
These proposals are laudable for their attempt to ensure quality
care, protect patients from the costs of medical malpractice, and
ensure that the financial benefits of medical tourism inure directly to
the patient. These legislative proposals each share a fundamental
limitation, however, because domestic legislation has no ability to
bind foreign providers.3 23 As a result, these proposals must work
indirectly through insurance companies or brokerage firms to ensure
compliance with legislative standards.324 Medical tourists retain the
ability to arrange overseas medical care through the provider and
without the use of such an intermediary.3 25 The proposed regulation
therefore is only effective to protect the smaller subset of the medical
tourist population which enlists such third-party intermediaries.
Imposing regulatory requirements on intermediaries also necessarily
increases overhead costs for these third parties as they comply with
additional requirements, and these costs will almost certainly be
passed directly to the medical tourist. Thus, legislative proposals will
not only fail to protect adequately all medical tourists, but will also
reduce the cost incentives that comprise the primary benefit of
medical tourism. Rather than providing protections for all medical
tourists and ensuring uniform quality of care, these proposals may
increase the disparities in access to quality care already present.
Another proposed reform involves mandating vicarious or strict
liability on medical tourism brokers or health insurance companies
that facilitate overseas care by negligent providers.326 Because the
scope of this proposal is again limited to third parties, rather than the
321. See Brady, supra note 16, at 1112-13.
322. See Cortez, supra note 14, at 124.
323. See supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
324. See sources cited supra note 317.
325. See BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 61; Using a Medical Tourism
Facilitator, HEALTH-TOURISM.COM, http://www.health-tourism.com/medical-tourism/
using-facilitators/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2011) (describing the pros and cons of opting for a
"medical tourism facilitator" or broker). Though medical tourism brokerage firms are
common today, see Klaus, supra note 8, at 227-29, patients appear to be contracting
directly with providers, since provider websites continue to provide this option and to
market their services directly to individual patients. However, there are currently no
statistics to suggest the proportion of medical tourists who arrange for travel using one
method or the other.
326. See Cortez, supra note 14, at 122; Mirrer-Singer, supra note 16, at 231.
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health care providers themselves, it creates the same increased costs
and perverse policy outcomes as other legislative regulations.327 These
costs are likely to be even more substantial in the case of mandated
liability. Damages would be awarded under the litigious U.S. system,
reversing the cost benefits of avoiding malpractice liability. Vicarious
liability in a civil context is applied only in limited circumstances,
typically based on the theory of respondeat superior or on agency
principles.328 In either case, the party held vicariously liable is
generally required to exercise (or appear to exercise, in the case of
apparent agency theory) substantial control over the activities of the
negligent party.329 In the context of a medical tourism broker,
however, the foreign provider is much more likely to be operating as
an independent contractor of the brokerage firm, and will likely take
steps to avoid the appearance of agency.330 Thus, vicarious liability is
not likely to be a good fit for the facts of the brokerage relationship,
as mandating vicarious liability in such instances would require tort
law to be stretched beyond its current boundaries.33 1 Strict liability
tends to be statutorily defined;33 2 therefore, it may be a more feasible
alternative which does not conflict with the present state of the law.333
However, success on strict liability grounds would require a court to
overcome significant practical obstacles and further drive up the
expense of litigation.3 34
Analysts have also suggested that the federal government might
impose limitations, either direct or functional, on medical tourists'
327. But see Mirrer-Singer, supra note 16, at 229-31 (arguing for the imposition of
heightened liability standards on medical tourism brokers).
328. See id. at 219-20; see, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754-55
(1998) (holding that vicarious liability under Title VII claims is constrained by common
law agency principles); Lathrop v. Healthcare Partners Med. Grp., 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 668, 674
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing that vicarious liability is defined by "the common law
doctrine of respondeat superior").
329. See Mirrer-Singer, supra note 16, at 219-21 (discussing apparent agency theory in
the context of medical tourism).
330. See id.
331. See Cortez, supra note 14, at 122 (finding vicarious liability for insurance
companies authorizing medical tourism to be improper because "[c]urrently, employers
and insurers in many circumstances are not liable to the employee/insured for a provider's
negligence").
332. See Cortez, supra note 14, at 122; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.313(3) (West
2010) (creating statutory strict liability for pollution damages to property of adjoining
landowners).
333. But see Cortez, supra note 14, at 122 (suggesting that the practical difficulties and
legal uncertainty of applying strict liability to medical tourism could render such a scheme
"unworkable").
334. Id.
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travel overseas.335 However, this regulatory method likely would run
afoul of constitutional protection of the right to travel.336 Given the
policy considerations of implementing such restrictions as a means of
limiting access to medical care, restrictions on the right to travel
internationally are likely to be struck down by the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, even if these restrictions were to pass constitutional
muster, the practical challenges and expense of monitoring citizens'
overseas travel would substantially limit the effectiveness of these
regulations. Finally, such restrictions are likely to face significant
political opposition and are unlikely to garner sufficient support in
Congress.
Though critics have proffered various regulatory proposals as a
means of regulating medical tourism, these proposals will not be
effective in producing more beneficial outcomes for medical tourists.
While such proposals are commendable for their motives, they do not
enhance-and in some cases may even reduce-the benefits of
medical tourism for American patients. Whether imposing
restrictions or requirements on third-party intermediaries or seeking
to limit medical tourists' freedom to travel, these proposals are likely
to cause more harm than good and should be avoided.
335. See id. at 114. For example, the government could refuse to issue or validate
passports for individuals intending to engage in medical tourism, or more directly regulate
travel to medical tourism "target" countries. See id. at 117.
336. See id. at 115-18. The U.S. Supreme Court has identified a robust right to travel
between states, which subjects limitations on interstate travel to a strict scrutiny standard.
Id. at 115; see, e.g., Att'y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 904 (1986); United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966). The standard of review for restrictions on
international travel is more ambiguous, but a series of cases has clearly established a right
to international travel, and this right likely is vindicated through a mode of analysis more
exacting than the rational basis test. See Califano v. Aznanorian, 439 U.S. 170, 176-78
(1978); Aptheker v. Sec'y. of State, 378 U.S. 500, 514 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116,
125-28 (1958), overruled on other grounds by Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984); Cortez,
supra note 14, at 116-17 (maintaining that, based on case law, "we can argue logically that
laws that have more than an 'incidental effect' on such travel should be subject to a more
stringent standard than the rational basis test"); Thomas E. Laursen, Note, Constitntional
[sic] Protection of Foreign Travel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 902, 906-08 (1981) (conceding that
the constitutional basis for the right to travel is "obscure," but recognizing the heightened
standard of review initially applied). The Supreme Court has utilized a rational basis test
to evaluate the constitutionality of restrictions which have a mere "incidental effect" on
international travel. Califano, 439 U.S. at 177; Cortez, supra note 14, at 115. However,
prior cases identifying a more direct effect on international travel have implied the need
for a more exacting test. See Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 508, 514 (requiring more narrowly
tailored federal restrictions on passport use and applications); Kent, 357 U.S. at 125-28
(describing the vital nature of interstate travel and the exigency previously required to
restrict international travel); Cortez, supra note 14, at 116-17; Laursen, supra, at 908.
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C. Industry Self-Regulation
Though it cannot be used as a complete regulatory "fix" for
medical tourism, self-regulation provides a more promising
alternative to other ineffective forms of regulation. Self-regulation
plays a role in the regulation of the American health care industry,
primarily through the action of non-governmental organizations.337
Organizations such as the American Medical Association and the
Joint Commission provide education and oversight to the providers
they represent.338 These organizations do not operate in a vacuum;
rather, they work in tandem with government regulatory agencies by
enhancing the regulatory framework the government has already put
in place.339 Government oversight is intended to provide a
disinterested source of supervision by individuals unconnected to the
industry who are unlikely to benefit directly from its increased
profits.3 40 in contrast, self-regulatory agencies-by definition-
employ industry participants with greater knowledge of the industry
and its inner workings,341  knowledge which is used to inform
regulatory choices and ensure maximal quality and efficiency among
providers.342 In theory, these regulatory methods provide a stronger
means of regulation by ensuring both informed decision making and
unbiased regulatory choices in the domestic health care market.
To date, voluntary industry self-regulation has been the principal
regulatory mechanism employed to preserve the quality of the
medical tourism market. This mechanism provides substantial
regulatory benefit to the industry. Several regulatory organizations,
most notably the JCI, provide the primary source of quality assurance
outside the destination country's own regulatory framework, by
providing accreditation to medical tourism facilities.3 43 Though this
may appear to be a weaker source of protection than the dual system
337. See HARRIS, supra note 124, at 69-70.
338. See FIELD, supra note 135, at 9-10, 70-72.
339. See id. at 44-45; HARRIS, supra note 124, at 69-70; see also ROBERT BALDWIN &
MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE
136-37 (1999) ("Nearly all self-regulatory mechanisms of governmental significance are
subject to some degree of external state influence ...
340. See HARRIS, supra note 124, at 69-70.
341. See id.
342. See BALDWIN & CAVE, supra note 339, at 127.
343. See, e.g., Brady, supra note 16, at 1096. Accreditation by the Joint Commission
and JCI is discussed supra Part I.B.1.b. Accreditation and oversight are also provided by
several other organizations, such as the International Society for Quality in Health Care
and the European Society for Quality in Healthcare, but these organizations have not
attained the same degree of recognition as the JCI, particularly within the United States.
See DELOITTrE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, supra note 2, at 8.
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adopted by the United States, the limitations of this system as applied
to foreign providers are not as significant as they may appear.
American lawmakers claiming to represent regulatory disinterested
parties are not necessarily as disinterested as they purport to be.
Nothing prohibits individual politicians from being personally
invested, either financially or professionally,'" in the health care
industry, and the strong health care and health insurance industry
lobbies provide further pressure and incentive to create pro-industry
laws and policies.3 45 Furthermore, unlike the true self-regulation of a
domestic industry-as is provided by Joint Commission regulation in
the United States34 6-JCI members provide oversight for health care
providers in nations other than their own. Despite its international
focus, the JCI maintains strong ties to the United States; specifically,
its primary headquarters is located in the United States, and the vast
majority of its officers and directors-as well as many of its managers
and consultants-reside in the United States.347
Facilities do pay the JCI to establish and maintain
accreditation,348 providing some financial incentive for undue
accreditation. This fact, coupled with a low rate of revocation among
facilities previously granted accreditation, has comprised the primary
source of criticism regarding the JCI.349 Such criticisms may be overly
reactionary, however, as the JCI has stronger motivations not to
engage in lax accreditation tactics. The JCI's status as a world leader
of hospital accreditation and its future utility may only be maintained
through its continued ability to ensure the quality of international
hospitals and safety of its patients. Lax accreditation would only serve
to jeopardize the JCI's reputation and continued success. Because JCI
accreditation has become a valued and relatively rare commodity
344. In fact, a number of federal and state legislators previously worked as physicians
before being elected, and their medical knowledge-and potential professional biases-
likely inform their political decision making. See, e.g., Joel Roberts, Doctors in Congress
Criticized: Should Frist, Others Have Made Schiavo Diagnoses Based on Videos?, CBS
NEWS (Mar. 22, 2005), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/22/politics/main
682208.shtml.
345. See supra Part II.A.3.
346. The Joint Commission is not only comprised and staffed by individual medical
professionals, but it also has a "membership . .. composed of virtually every hospital in the
country." FIELD, supra note 135, at 43.
347. See 2010 JCI Board of Directors, JOINT COMM'N INT'L,
http://www.jointcommissioninternational.org/JCI-Board-of-Directors/ (last visited Jan. 3,
2011); Contact Us, JOINT COMM'N INT'L, http://www.jointcommissioninternational.org/
Contact-Us/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2011).
348. See JOINT COMM'N INT'L, supra note 119, at 7; see also Brady, supra note 16, at
1096.
349. See Brady, supra note 16, at 1096.
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among international hospitals,350 the JCI would be unwise to saturate
its potential market by providing more accreditation than is justified.
The JCI is also a non-profit organization."' Though American non-
profit law does not prohibit the JCI from earning a profit, any profit
earned by the corporation cannot inure to private individuals
affiliated with the organization for it to retain its non-profit status,352
thus reducing the personal financial incentive for JCI officials to
encourage undue accreditation. For these reasons, the JCI appears to
be a relatively disinterested regulatory body despite its self-regulatory
status. Because JCI accreditation is provided by a largely
disinterested and knowledgeable regulatory body, additional
regulatory mechanisms do not serve the same vital role under the
American system or hold the same potential to persuade medical
tourism facilities to provide quality care.
Together, these factors suggest that the JCI provides a significant
degree of protection and quality control over medical tourism
facilities, even greater than the protection provided by accreditation
in the United States. Perhaps the only feasible regulatory proposal
suggested by medical tourism critics has been to impose reporting
requirements on the JCLY' The JCI could be required to provide to
the federal government quality statistics on the medical tourism
facilities it accredits. This would enable the federal government to
provide medical tourists with this information and empower them to
make more fully informed decisions regarding their care.354
Furthermore, the Joint Commission is intimately connected with
Medicare and Medicaid through its statutory authority and
recognized prominence in U.S. hospital accreditation."' Because the
Joint Commission would jeopardize its favored status if its
350. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
351. Facts About Joint Commission International, JOINT COMM'N, http://www.joint
commission.orglassets/l/18/Joint%20Commission%2OInternational2.PDF (last visited Jan.
3,2011).
352. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
353. See Cortez, supra note 14, at 125-26. The author also suggests broader oversight
of the JCI in order to ensure accreditation adheres to proper safety and quality standards.
Id. While such oversight is theoretically favorable, it may not be necessary given the fact
that the JCI is largely comprised of American medical professionals supervising overseas
providers, decreasing the incentive for JCI to over-accredit foreign competitors to their
American peers. See supra notes 346-47 and accompanying text. Moreover, increased
oversight (as opposed to mere reporting requirements) may result in greater opposition
from foreign providers, as it may be viewed as an indirect attempt to impose protectionist
trade barriers on foreign medical services.
354. The need for increased transparency is discussed infra Part III.B.
355. See supra Part I.B.1.b.
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international arm failed to comply with governmental requirements,
the JCI's status as a subsidiary of the Joint Commission incentivizes
compliance with such mandated transparency.356
This proposal avoids some of the limitations inherent in other
regulatory approaches. Although the heightened reporting
requirements may increase the JCI's operating expenses to some
degree-as well as those of the facilities it accredits-these additional
expenses are not likely to be so burdensome that they will be passed
on to individual patients in the form of substantially increased costs.
Furthermore, though the JCI does not presently release data on
individual facilities it accredits, the organization has stated its
intention to release this information voluntarily when facilities have
been accredited in a number sufficient to allow valid comparison.35
Thus, JCI-accredited facilities cannot argue that they reasonably
anticipated the JCI would maintain the confidentiality of their
accreditation scores when the JCI eventually releases this information
to the public. Though the JCI could encounter some opposition to its
reporting directly to the U.S. government, which might be interpreted
as protectionist or meddling in the affairs of other nations, this
argument is not likely to stand given the relative openness of the
JCI's long-term confidentiality plan. Moreover, medical tourism
facilities likely would allow the information to be reported to the
United States, given their desire to protect their attractiveness to
American patients and to maintain internationally-recognized stature
via JCI accreditation.
Although this regulatory proposal has merit, it cannot provide a
complete solution to the regulatory pitfalls of medical tourism.
Economic theorists have posited that industry self-regulation alone
does not provide an effective regulatory scheme.358 Outside sanctions
are often important elements for effective industry self-regulation, as
they provide industry regulators with incentive to ensure quality and
356. This rationale is further suggested by the federal government's recent attempts to
grant other organizations statutory authority to conduct Medicare and Medicaid
certifications, which could detract from the Joint Commission's prominence. See Gourley,
supra note 140, at 12.
357. See JOINT COMM'N INT'L, supra note 119, at 8.
358. See BALDWIN & CAVE, supra note 339, at 126-33 (describing various criticisms of
industry self-regulation and advocating that self-regulatory mechanisms promote fairness,
foster accountability, and pursue proper objectives); John Braithwaite & Brent Fisse, Self
Regulation and the Control of Corporate Crime, in 23 SAGE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
ANNUALS: PRIVATE POLICING 221, 224 (Clifford D. Shearing & Philip C. Stenning eds.,
1987).
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regulated market actors with incentive to comply.359 Medical tourism
facilities are not required to follow JCI standards, as no regulatory
body exists with jurisdiction to enforce these standards through
sanctions or other forms of reprisal. If a medical tourism facility
decides not to pursue accreditation, it is free to recruit medical
tourists and provide medical care according to standards which the
facility alone selects. In spite of the JCI's clout and relative
disinterest, such self-regulation would be unlikely-without
additional forces to further incentivize quality control-to be
effective in mandating high-quality care. Thus, despite its benefits,
JCI accreditation is a flawed regulatory mechanism which could not,
by itself, provide complete oversight or remedy for medical tourism's
regulatory pitfalls.
However, a much stronger and more effective regulatory
mechanism does exist, which complements the incentives of JCI
regulation and is uniquely suited to the medical tourism context: the
driving force of the market itself.
III. MARKET-BASED SOLUTION TO MEDICAL TOURISM
REGULATION
Although medical tourism represents a favorable trade-off for
American patients to obtain inexpensive and comparably safe
medical care, the practice does entail some risks to patients. At
present, comprehensive regulation of medical tourism does not
appear feasible given the state of the American health care regulatory
system, and its desirability is questionable.360 As this section will
argue, however, substantial government regulation may not be
necessary based on the inherent protections provided by a "modified"
free-market approach.36' By increasing transparency for medical
359. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 105-06, 125 (1992) (describing the
inherent flaws in purely voluntary self-regulation); Avner Greif, Microtheory and Recent
Developments in the Study of Economic Institutions Through Economic History, in 2
ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 79, 88-
89, 99-102 (David M. Kreps & Kenneth F. Wallis eds., 1997) (using historical examples of
self-regulating Maghribi and Genoese traders to suggest that social and economic
penalties are necessary to prevent opportunistic behavior among individual economic
actors); Andrew A. King & Michael J. Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions:
The Chemical Industry's Responsible Care Program, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 698, 713 (2000)
(suggesting that explicit sanctions are required to prevent opportunism among self-
regulating firms).
360. See supra Part II.
361. As is argued infra Part II.B, increased transparency is not inconsistent with the
concept of a free market; in fact, it may serve to enhance the effectiveness of a largely
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tourists to allow them to make informed care decisions, U.S. officials
can bolster the effects of market forces to protect American patients
more effectively and to preserve medical tourism's benefits for those
it will help the most.
A. Market-Driven Approach to Regulatory Pitfalls
1. Effects of the Market on Medical Tourism
The market for consumers' business within a particular industry
produces powerful effects on the behavior of industry participants.
Free market theory posits that the interaction between suppliers and
consumers of a particular good or service will determine the
economic behavior of both types of actors.362 Each acts according to
his own free will in a way that maximizes his own interest.3 63 These
actions, in turn, determine the prices at which goods and services are
sold and, indirectly, the quality with which they are produced.3 64
Through general economic principles of supply and demand,
competition among providers in a particular industry will tend to
lower costs and increase efficiency among these providers.3 65
At the same time, quality considerations require providers to be
mindful of the value of the goods or services they are providing,
particularly in industries such as medicine, in which consumers are
unwilling to sacrifice quality for the sake of cost savings.366 Though
improved quality will often increase price,3 67 the producer who is able
to provide a maximal balance between quality and price will win
consumers' business.3 68 These forces are at work in the health care
unregulated market. However, to distinguish from traditional notions of free-market
economics, this Comment has termed this proposed system a "modified" free-market
approach.
362. See IBRAHIM OZER ERTUNA, WEALTH, WELFARE, AND THE GLOBAL FREE
MARKET 16 (2009).
363. See id.; ANDREW SCHOTrER, FREE MARKET ECONOMICS: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL 2 (Basil Blackwell 2d ed. 1990) (1985).
364. See ERTUNA, supra note 362, at 16.
365. See id. at 56; HARRIS, supra note 124, at 69.
366. See SHERMAN FOLLAND ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH AND HEALTH
CARE 199 (4th ed. 2004) (recognizing that the "provision of quality information does
influence consumers, particularly when the quality ratings are negative").
367. See id. at 196-200.
368. See James Gubb & Stephen Smith, Will a Market Deliver Quality and Efficiency in
Health Care Better Than Central Planning Ever Could? Yes, 340 BRIT. MED. J. 568, 569
(2010); William B. Schwartz, The Competitive Strategy: Will It Affect Quality of Care? Yes,
in MARKET REFORMS IN HEALTH CARE 15, 15-16 (Jack A. Meyer ed., 1983) (describing
how competitive market forces will tend to weed out "wasteful" and "unnecessary"
medical treatments and recognizing that "[t]he incentives provided by competition can be
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industry as well.369 When given the choice, purchasers (whether
patients or managed care organizations) will spend their money
obtaining the highest quality and lowest cost health care available,
and other providers will be forced to adjust their practices accordingly
or risk losing substantial profits and going out of business.370 Because
these forces operate to preserve the quality of health care provided to
patients, proponents of a market-based regulatory approach suggest
that these market forces are sufficient to protect the wellbeing and
safety of patients without the need for substantial outside
regulation.3 71 In its most basic form, a market-based approach would
preserve these beneficial market effects and ensure that the market is
operating as efficiently as possible.
Medical tourism appears particularly well-suited to a market-
based regulatory approach to health care regulation. This is true for
several reasons. First, the quality of care provided to medical tourists
will be preserved by distinctive features of the medical tourism
market. As a general economic rule, a producer's reputation provides
substantial incentive to constrain opportunistic behavior.372 Because
consumers choose producers based on a price-quality analysis, 73 a
loss of reputation in either of these elements will necessarily result in
a loss of profit in a competitive market. This is particularly true in the
medical tourism context. American patients tend to be skeptical of
expected to address this problem: Providers will be stimulated to offer service of a given
quality at the lowest possible cost").
369. FOLLAND ET AL., supra note 366, at 200 (recognizing that "the provider's ability
to raise prices above those charged by others and to sell low-quality services at high-
quality prices is significantly constrained"); Gubb & Smith, supra note 368, at 569;
Schwartz, supra note 368, at 15-16. However, these market forces are somewhat
attenuated for the health care industry due to "market failure" factors. See infra Part
III.A.2.
370. See HARRIS, supra note 124, at 69 ("In America's free market economy,
competition ordinarily improves the quality and reduces the price of goods and services
for the benefit of the consumer ... in the health care industry, competition may be able to
promote quality and reduce costs as providers compete among themselves for managed
care contracts.").
371. See, e.g., John F. Cogan et al., Healthy, Wealthy, and Wise, HOOVER DIG., 2004, at
161, 163-65; Grace-Marie Turner, Toward Free-Market Health Care, HERITAGE FOUND.,
2 (May 4, 2007), http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/toward-free-market-health-care.
It must be noted, however, that the effectiveness of free-market regulation of health care
has been rejected by many scholars, at least in the domestic context. See, e.g., FIELD, supra
note 135, at 40, 202-04.
372. Gerald P. O'Driscoll Jr. & Lee Hoskins, The Case for Market-Based Regulation,
26 CATO J. 469, 474 (2006); see Daniel B. Klein, Trust for Hire: Voluntary Remedies for
Quality and Safety, in REPUTATION: STUDIES IN THE VOLUNTARY ELICITATION OF
GOOD CONDUCT 97, 105 (Daniel B. Klein ed. 1997).
373. See BALDWIN & CAVE, supra note 339, at 210-11; FIELD, supra note 135, at 16.
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overseas medical care; reports have suggested that concerns about the
quality of care in developing countries is one of the primary factors
limiting increased participation in medical tourism.374 Patients are
highly unlikely to travel to a particular medical tourism facility if they
believe they may experience adverse medical outcomes.37 5 Without
the ability to lure medical tourists to obtain services through the
reports of its high-quality care, a facility will be unable to survive
competition with other, higher-quality facilities. Thus, the ability of a
medical tourism provider to maintain a positive reputation is crucial
to its continued viability in the medical tourism market.
At the same time, medical tourists retain the ability to influence
the reputation of individual providers. Because most medical tourists
have used web-based resources to arrange their medical services, they
could easily use these same resources to alert future patients of poor
quality care they receive; such information is likely to spread quickly
to the medical tourism community and to affect the behavior of future
medical tourists.376 In order to attract patients and maintain a viable
patient base, medical tourism facilities therefore must ensure that the
quality of care they provide remains high.
Second, a market-based regulatory method avoids imposing
barriers to access on potential medical tourists. Medical tourism is
ultimately designed to supplement, rather than supplant, the
American domestic health care system. It functions to provide
additional options to those who otherwise have difficulty obtaining
health care.377 The value of this system is derived primarily from its
competitive cost advantage, which allows American patients to obtain
high-quality health care at a low price. In order to maintain the value
of this system for American patients, this competitive cost advantage
must be preserved. As medical tourism facilities are able to compete
directly to provide the services to a relatively limited number of
foreign patients, the competitive forces acting on these providers will
continue to preserve the cost advantage for future medical tourists.7
Further, additional regulation imposes added costs to producers,
which are often passed on to the consumer in the form of increased
374. See, e.g., BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 60, 145; see also Mattoo &
Rathindran, supra note 39, at 364 (suggesting that concerns about quality of care is one of
the major factors preventing insurance companies from covering medical tourism).
375. See BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 60,145.
376. Klaus, supra note 8, at 236.
377. See supra Parts I.A.1, I.A.4.
378. See BALDWIN & CAVE, supra note 339, at 210-11.
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prices.3 79 For this reason, the imposition of additional regulatory
mechanisms on the medical tourism industry will tend to impede the
very benefit which drives the medical tourism market and provides
benefits to its participants. In the context of a system which provides
a service vital to many American patients, a patient's choice to
participate in the practice should be paramount. Yet a more
substantial regulatory scheme would limit the cost savings available to
medical tourists and directly inhibit patients' choices. A market-based
approach is most appropriate precisely because it is the only approach
ultimately able to preserve the value of the practice for patients-by
maintaining the net positive balance of cost and quality which makes
its service so valuable.
2. Attenuated Market Failure in the Medical Tourism Market
In addition to these inherent benefits of a market-based
regulatory approach, such an approach provides the most appropriate
form of regulation because more stringent regulatory methods are
unjustified in the medical tourism context. Common American beliefs
regarding the value of capitalistic market forces have characterized
the U.S. policy approach to health care, particularly within the last
few decades.380 Debate continues to rage over the ability of market
forces to protect the interests of patients.38' Prior to the enactment of
the PPACA, the American health care system had been more
strongly market-based than those of other industrialized nations,
which rely heavily upon public industries through national health care
systems and which utilize private insurance in a much more limited
manner.38 2 Some scholars point to the inability of American
regulators to stem the rising tide of health care costs and unequal
access to care as indicative of the inevitable failure of a market-based
379. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH
CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION 5 (2004), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/healthcare/
204694.pdf (recognizing in the domestic health care context that "[e]mpirical studies have
found that licensing regulation increases costs for consumers").
380. See CARL F. AMERINGER, THE HEALTH CARE REVOLUTION: FROM MEDICAL
MONOPOLY TO MARKET COMPETITION 1-2 (2008); Cortez, supra note 49, at 662 ("Most
health care systems have incorporated at least some market based tools to increase
competition and efficiency, which tends to invite more private sector participation. It is no
coincidence that the United States' health care system relies most heavily on these market
principles among developed countries and also invites the most private sector
participation.").
381. See, e.g., FIELD, supra note 135, at 40, 202-04.
382. Id. at 203-04; see Cortez, supra note 49, at 662.
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approach.383 However, most analysts recognize that full market forces
are unable to operate in the American health care system due to the
unique nature of this industry.3 84
Current regulation of the American health care system has been
justified largely based on these inherent limitations of a market-only
approach to ensuring quality. Specifically, two primary issues have
been identified as the sources of health care market failure: limited
competition and absence of sufficient information to choose better-
quality providers.385 Competition is limited in the U.S. health care
system in two primary ways. First, managed care providers and third-
party payors operate through an oligopolistic competition structure
and exert significant control over both consumers' access to providers
and their ability to choose providers and terms of care.386 These
pressures directly limit consumer choice and also distort the
connection between consumer choice, quality, and cost-effectiveness
considerations. In addition, the law of supply and demand often is
attenuated for health care services due to "inelasticity of demand," 387
which results from patients' pressing need for services and their
inability to take advantage of quality and cost comparisons when
choosing a provider.3 8  Even where quality and cost comparison data
are available, empirical studies have shown that American patients
often fail to use this type of information when purchasing care,389
further emphasizing the inelasticity effects.
Furthermore, analysts highlight the technical nature of health
care services and the difficulty and inaccuracy with which patients are
able to measure and compare quality.39 0 These factors create an
383. See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 49, at 682; Len M. Nichols et al., Are Market Forces
Strong Enough to Deliver Efficient Health Care Systems? Confidence Is Waning, HEALTH
AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 8, 8-15.
384. See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, COMPETITION AS PUBLIC POLICY
120 (2010); FIELD, supra note 135, at 202-04; Nichols et al., supra note 383, at 11-15.
385. See FIELD, supra note 135, at 202; HARRIS, supra note 124, at 69.
386. See Mattoo & Rathindran, supra note 39, at 365-66; Nichols et al., supra note 383,
at 14 (describing the "[i]nsufficient health plan competition" and barriers to entry within
the health insurance market).
387. "Inelasticity of demand" occurs when changes to the price of a good or service do
not affect-or affect in only a limited manner-demand for that service. See FIELD, supra
note 135, at 202.
388. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 384, at 13; Id.
389. See NAT'L COMM. FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE, supra note 119, at 13, 15; HENRY
J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE RESEARCH & QUALITY,
NATIONAL SURVEY ON AMERICANS AS HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS: AN UPDATE ON
THE ROLE OF QUALITY INFORMATION (2000), http://www.ahrq.gov/downloads/pub/
kffchartbk00.pdf; Cohen, supra note 117, at 1508-10.
390. FIELD, supra note 135, at 16.
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"asymmetry of information" between patients and providers.391 These
limitations tend to inhibit the ability of medical consumers to make
fully informed choices when deciding between the limited pool of
available providers,3 " thereby preventing consumer choice from fully
preserving quality of care. Such concerns are considered even more
critical than in other industries because the consequences of poor
consumer choice are dire and may not be discovered until a fatal
error already has been made.93
However, due to the nature of the medical tourism industry, both
forms of market failure are substantially attenuated in that context.
The inelasticity of demand which typically characterizes the
American health care system is more severe than that currently
observed in the medical tourism industry. Medical tourism cannot be
used to provide all types of patient care, but only those nonroutine
procedures which allow for a delay in treatment sufficient to permit
medical tourists to arrange travel. This delay permits medical tourists
the opportunity to comparison shop between potential providers and
to choose a provider with high quality and low prices. Medical
tourists' increased incentives to conduct such comparison shopping394
will also tend to enhance this effect. Additionally, medical tourism is
much less convenient than selecting a provider in the patient's
hometown and requires a significant investment of time and
resources;395 thus, patients may be more likely to investigate the
option-as well as its various providers-before choosing to obtain
medical services in this manner. Additionally, current medical tourists
typically pay for their medical care out of pocket and are not impeded
in their decision making by the interference of third-party payors.396
Notwithstanding the obvious benefits third-party payors could derive
from engaging in medical tourism, it is uncertain whether this trend is
likely to change in the near future.397 These factors, taken together,
suggest that demand is likely to be substantially more elastic in the
391. Id. at 202. "Asymmetry of information" refers to a circumstance in which either
the buyer or seller of a good or service has access to material information not available to
the other party. See id.
392. Id. at 16, 202.
393. Id.
394. See supra notes 374-76 and accompanying text.
395. See Medical Tourism Hearing, supra note 17, at 2, 4, 7 (describing one patient's
experience with medical tourism, which included a month-long stay in the destination
country, substantial Internet research to find providers, and visa approval from the
destination country).
396. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 41-60 and accompanying text.
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medical tourism context than in the domestic health care market.
They further suggest that the low costs and high quality of medical
care provided by medical tourism facilities will better influence
patient purchasing decisions and will result in more efficient and
effective care at similar facilities than is currently observed in the
United States.3 98
Medical tourism is also likely to avoid many of the informational
asymmetries inherent to the domestic health care market. In the
United States, informational asymmetries are attributable to several
causes. Patients generally lack education or technical expertise in the
medical field and seek out medical providers "for the explicit purpose
of obtaining health information" which they would not otherwise
have.3 99 American patients are historically unmotivated (or unable) to
compare potential domestic providers for quality and price before
selecting a provider.40 0 They are also less able to rely on prior
experience in discriminating between high and low quality care-
unlike providers, whose experience in trading medical services is
informed by day-to-day experience. 4 1 Even where patients are
cognitively capable of obtaining quality information and willing to do
so, the high "search-information cost" of obtaining this information is
likely to act as a functional bar to obtaining it.402 Together, these
factors establish American patients' inability to make informed cost
and quality comparisons when choosing providers.
In contrast, these obstacles are attenuated in the medical tourism
context. The apathy of American patients in differentiating between
providers may stem from a variety of cognitive barriers, including an
overly optimistic appraisal of domestic health care providers43 and a
398. See Terry, supra note 7, at 469 ("In the absence of negative evidence ... it is
arguable that foreign-sourced, low-cost, high-quality care will stimulate global health care
and reduce the market failures seen in Western systems.").
399. Frank A. Sloan, Arrow's Concept of the Health Care Consumer: A Forty-Year
Retrospective, in UNCERTAIN TIMES: KENNETH ARROW AND THE CHANGING
ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE 49, 49 (Peter J. Hammer et al. eds., 2003).
400. See supra note 389 and accompanying text.
401. See Sloan, supra note 399, at 50.
402. See id. at 52-53. "Search information costs," also referred to as "search costs," are
defined as the costs to the consumer of acquiring information relevant to purchasing
decisions. See Gerald E. Smith et al., Diagnosing the Search Cost Effect: Waiting Time and
the Moderating Impact of Prior Category Knowledge, 20 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 285, 286
(1999). These costs include monetary resources, such as the sums expended in searching
for information and opportunity costs of engaging in search, as well as the cognitive efforts
necessary to process information and make decisions. Id.
403. See Cohen, supra note 117, at 1510; Arnold Milstein & Nancy E. Adler, Out of
Sight, Out of Mind: Why Doesn't Widespread Clinical Quality Failure Command Our
Attention?, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 119, 122.
676 [Vol. 89
FIGHTING FIRE WITH FIRE
tendency to conflate familiarity with trustworthiness.40 However,
medical tourism departs from the traditional method of procuring
care within the United States-choosing local providers
recommended by other individuals or insurance companies405-and
obtaining overseas care requires a substantial investment of time and
resources. The initial reaction of many Americans to the concept of
medical tourism is apprehensive at best,406 providing potential
medical tourists with incentive to second guess the practice and
investigate the quality of medical tourism facilities before selecting a
provider. These factors are likely to reduce the inherent optimism
patients carry for domestic providers and may signal to patients the
need to investigate quality and cost further before engaging in
medical tourism.407 For these reasons, medical tourists appear
substantially more likely to employ quality comparison information
when choosing between providers.
Additionally, the effects of search costs are reduced in the
medical tourism context. The medical tourism market is dominated
by a relatively limited number of providers, particularly in
comparison to the domestic health care market.408 Patients, therefore,
are required to process much less information in the medical tourism
context before making an informed provider decision. The medical
tourism industry also has developed a business model requiring
widespread dissemination of quality information over the Internet for
its very survival.409 Patients seeking information about medical
tourism facilities find online resources more central to their decision
404. Milstein & Adler, supra note 403 at 122.
405. See FOLLAND ET AL., supra note 366, at 196 (describing health care as a
"reputation good," defined as "a good for which consumers rely on the information
provided by friends, neighbors, and others to select from the various services available in
the market").
406. See Klaus, supra note 8, at 233-34.
407. See Cohen, supra note 117, at 1482-85 (discussing how medical tourists choose
where to obtain treatment); id. at 1539-41 (discussing critics' concerns about medical
tourists receiving substandard care and what can be done to address the problem).
408. Compare About Joint Commission International: International Accreditation and
Certification, JOINT COMM'N INT'L, http://www.jointcommissioninternational.org/about-
jcil (last visited Jan. 3, 2011) (recognizing the number of JCI accredited international
facilities at "more than 300"), with Fast Facts on US Hospitals, AM. HosP. ASS'N,
http://www.aha.org/aha/resource-center/Statistics-and-Studies/fast-facts.html (last updated
Dec. 6, 2010) (reporting that as of 2008, approximately 5,815 "registered" hospitals were
operating within the United States).
409. See BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 61-62; Neil Lunt et al., Nip, Tuck &
Click: Medical Tourism and the Emergence of Web-Based Health Information, 4 OPEN
MED. INFORMATICS J. 1, 1 (2010) (recognizing that "[a] key driver in the Medical Tourism
phenomenon is the platform provided by the internet for gaining access to healthcare
information and advertising").
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making than those patients seeking domestic medical services.410 This
fact, in turn, ensures that the tools for selecting a provider are
accessible to medical tourists at the touch of a button, which is not
necessarily true of domestic patients. For these reasons, the "search-
information costs" of investigating medical tourism are likely to be
substantially reduced for potential medical tourists. This, in turn,
should enable medical tourists to utilize information more effectively
to evaluate provider quality than in the domestic context.
For these various reasons, factors unique to the medical tourism
market will overcome the market failures intrinsic to the domestic
health care industry. By inhibiting the effects of both asymmetric
information and inelasticity of demand, these factors serve to reduce
limitations on market forces which, in turn, reduce the efficiency of
the market and its effectiveness as a regulatory force.41  Because
medical tourism lacks the substantial market failures experienced in
the domestic health care context, these factors cannot be used as a
justification for restrictive regulations similar to those imposed in the
domestic health care industry.
B. Enhancing the Market Through Increased Transparency
Notwithstanding these substantial attenuations of market failure
in the medical tourism context, the nature of medical tourism cannot
fully eliminate the informational asymmetries between patients and
providers. Medical tourists will still lack expertise in the medical field
relative to their providers,412 and information regarding quality of
medical tourism facilities may not be entirely accurate or sufficient to
promote fully informed patient choice.413 Rather than using this
410. Compare BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 61-62 (describing the
importance of web-based medical tourism resources for consumers), and Lunt et al., supra
note 409, at 1-3 (explaining the vital importance of web-based information to medical
tourism providers), with Ha T. Tu & Johanna R. Lauer, Word of Mouth and Physician
Referrals Still Drive Health Care Provider Choice, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS.
CHANGE, 2-3 (Dec. 2008), http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/1028/1028.pdf
(recognizing that patients primarily choose primary care providers through word of mouth
recommendations and health plan information rather than web-based resources).
411. See FIELD, supra note 135, at 202-04; see also FOLLAND ET AL., supra note 366, at
188-94 (discussing inefficiencies and information asymmetries in the health care market
that create the possibility of adverse provider selection).
412. See FIELD, supra note 135, at 202 ("Physicians know much more about their
patients' medical needs than the patients themselves, so it is extremely difficult for the
consumers of health care to decide on their own what services they should purchase.").
413. See Lunt et al., supra note 409, at 5; see also Cohen, supra note 117, at 1506-11
(discussing problems with the availability and quality of information both within the
United States and abroad).
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residual market failure as a justification for heavy regulation of the
practice of medical tourism, however, policymakers can attempt to
improve patients' access to relevant information, thereby enhancing
the informed nature and overall quality of medical tourists' decision
making. By taking steps to make the medical tourism industry more
transparent to American consumers, regulators may both protect the
benefits of medical tourism and help to protect patients from its
hidden risks.
Efforts to enhance transparency of the medical tourism industry
may provide a more appropriate avenue through which regulators can
appropriately protect patient safety and ensure quality of care
overseas. Heavy regulation in the name of protecting patients from
inadequate information or bad decision making may wax unduly
paternalistic, as it is based in part on assumptions that the typical
patient is neither sufficiently informed nor sufficiently self-efficacious
to investigate her own care. In the modern technological context,
these assumptions also may be inaccurate.414 The Internet has made
available to curious consumers data on quality of patient care,
provider credentials, international medical and legal standards, and
other considerations equally relevant to medical tourism; information
also has been promulgated in print medical tourism guides.415 Web
resources such as Healism.com provide message boards through
which past medical tourists can leave both positive and negative
feedback for future medical tourists.416 Resources intended to assist a
potential medical tourist's decision making abound.
However, the type of transparency necessary to remedy market
failure requires more than these available resources. Some Internet
sources may provide unreliable or biased information, 417 and
consumers looking for a balanced assessment of the practice may
have to sift through the many testimonial pages run by medical
tourism brokers who benefit financially from providing positively-
skewed statements to potential consumers. More fundamentally, even
the most truthful testimonials have only limited benefit to consumers.
414. See FIELD, supra note 135, at 40 (recognizing the availability of physician data and
suggesting that "[p]erhaps patients finally have the tools to begin to take greater
responsibility for assessing the quality of their own care").
415. BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 60-64. See generally WOODMAN, supra
note 7 (providing an example of a print medical tourism guide).
416. See Testimonials, HEALISM.COM, http://www.healism.com/forum/listcat/
testimonials/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2011); see also Parsiyar, supra note 13, at 384 (describing
available Internet communities).
417. Lunt et al., supra note 409, at 5 ("There is evidence that the quality of online
information continues to vary widely.").
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Medical tourists face substantial information costs in both time and
money when trying to obtain information about potential providers.418
Where it is available, comparative data on health care quality and
cost are usually highly technical in nature and difficult for laypersons
to follow. 419 To better enable medical tourists to make informed
decisions about the providers they choose-or, ultimately, whether to
choose to engage in medical tourism at all-large compilations of
reliable and easily-accessible data on quality and cost are necessary.
To accomplish this task, American regulators can rely on a
familiar entity: the Joint Commission.420 Through its international
affiliate, the JCI, the Joint Commission collects large amounts of data
from international health care facilities on a regular basis for the
purpose of providing and maintaining accreditation. 42 1 This data
includes detailed ratings of virtually all aspects of a facility's
operations, from patient safety, disease prevention, and continuity of
care practices to staff credentialing and hospital governance
standards. 422 The United States should take advantage of this data
collection as a regulatory tool by ensuring that the Joint Commission
adheres to its promise to make this information publically available.
The government should further synthesize the data in a way that is
more readily available to laypersons (for example, by providing the
data for free online) and easier to apply to medical tourism decision
making. For example, the government might choose to provide a
facility-by-facility comparison of all relevant quality factors evaluated
by the JC. The analysis should also include an easily understood
explanation of each of the reported factors and their significance to
418. Terry, supra note 7, at 465-66.
419. See FIELD, supra note 135, at 16; see also NAT'L COMM. FOR QUALITY
ASSURANCE, supra note 119, at 16 ("Health care is often a confusing world of technical
language not easily understood by most people. Poor understanding between heath care
providers and patients leads to poor quality care.").
420. See supra Part I.B.1.b.
421. See JOINT COMM'N INT'L, supra note 119, at 5-10. The JCI obtains data from each
facility it surveys during the initial accreditation process and every three years after
accreditation is granted, as well as periodically between these standard surveys on an as-
needed basis. See id. Currently, more than 300 health care facilities have been accredited
by the JCL. About Joint Commission International: International Accreditation and
Certification, JOINT COMM'N INT'L, http://www.jointcommissioninternational.org/about-
jci/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2011).
422. See generally JOINT COMM'N INT'L, supra note 119 (collecting detailed data on
international accreditation standards for hospitals). The JCI has publicly committed to
publishing these ratings of individual facilities once a sufficient amount of data has been
obtained to enable quality comparisons. See id. at 8.
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overall care, to facilitate patients in making meaningful, informed
choices between providers.423
Although the JCI is not a government entity, it is likely to
comply with disclosure requirements due to its close affiliation with
the Joint Commission and its favored quasi-governmental status in
the United States.424 Because the Joint Commission already collects
this data during the accreditation process, no additional compliance
costs should be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices
for medical services.4 25 Furthermore, enhancing transparency may
also help to protect American medical tourists from being party to a
"race to the bottom" among medical tourism facilities. 426 Such a plan
would enable patients to better assess changes in quality over time
and avoid purchasing services from a particular facility if the quality
were to decrease significantly, before such decreases in quality
became standard throughout the industry. Thus, increasing
transparency through the JCI would help to remedy some of the
dangers of the practice while thoroughly preserving its benefits for
American patients.
Government-mandated transparency does not conflict
fundamentally with a market-based approach. In the wake of market
failures such as the Enron scandal of 2001 and the global financial
crisis of 2009, economists and political analysts alike have generally
recognized an underlying fallacy in the concept of an economic
system entirely free of governmental control.4 27 As one author has
recently noted, even "[t]he most absolutist of free-market advocates
now recognize that the state must be a guarantor of rules," due to the
informational asymmetries inherent in a market system.428
Transparency may be enhanced by private intermediaries designed to
dispense information to individual consumers, and the credibility of
these intermediaries ensures at least some degree of accuracy, as it
423. The importance of these factors in measuring the quality of care is discussed supra
Part I.B.1.
424. See supra Part I.B.1.b.
425. See supra Part I.B.1.b.
426. See Cortez, supra note 14, at 105.
427. For a small sampling of such arguments, see MARK A. MARTINEZ, THE MYTH OF
THE FREE MARKET: THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN A CAPITALIST ECONOMY, at xv (2009);
CLYDE PRESTOWITZ, THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN PROSPERITY: FREE MARKET
DELUSIONS, AMERICA'S DECLINE, AND How WE MUST COMPETE IN THE POST-
DOLLAR ERA 159 (2010); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE ROARING NINETIES: A NEW
HISTORY OF THE WORLD'S MOST PROSPEROUS DECADE 12-17 (2006).
428. GUY SORMAN, ECONOMICS DOES NOT LIE: A DEFENSE OF THE FREE MARKET
IN A TIME OF CRISIS 8 (Alexis Cornel trans., 2009).
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"stems from the fact that they risk their reputations and their money"
on the accuracy of their information.429 However,
[t]here is no last resort in this context other than the state, the
ultimate insurer when the market fails: The state also puts its
reputation and its funds on the line, though this is not to say
that it is absolutely trustworthy. Modern free-market theory
thus recognizes the essential role of good public institutions in
ensuring that transactions in national and international markets
lead to lasting economic development.430
At the -same time, markets are more likely to operate effectively
when the costs of the state's guaranty is lowest, allowing economic
actors to spend more on growth and less on adherence to state
regulations.43' When the methods of ensuring transparency are
carried out by a third-party organization and only mandated by the
government-as would be the case for the JCI-that organization
bears the lion's share of costs associated with repairing those
informational asymmetries. In this way, the medical tourism industry
may be regulated so that neither consumers nor providers shoulder
the ultimate cost of transparency.
Government regulation is particularly well-suited to a free
market theory when its regulations enhance the efficiency of the
market. In an efficient market, "prices reflect all available
information about the fundamentals." 432 Where regulation is designed
only to ensure that consumers are provided with all relevant
information about a given market, such regulation should act to
improve the efficient operation of that market.433 These conditions of
extreme transparency reflect the most basic assumptions on which
free-market theory is based. Thus, enhanced transparency remains
consistent with a modern understanding of free-market economics
and may serve to remedy the flaws inherent in the health care market.
429. Id. at 8-9.
430. Id. at 9.
431. See id. at 43-44.
432. STIGLITZ, supra note 427, at 61.
433. See generally Joseph Alba et al., Interactive Home Shopping: Consumer, Retailer,
and Manufacturer Incentives to Participate in Electronic Marketplaces, 61 J. MARKETING
38 (1997) (analyzing the implications of electronic shopping to retailers who receive more
complete information to aid them in their purchasing decisions); Yannis Bakos, Reducing
Buyer Search Costs: Implications for Electronic Marketplaces, 43 MGMT. SC. 1676 (1997)
(studying the role of electronic marketplaces in lowering information costs and reducing
market inefficiencies).
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C. Benefits to American Patients Generally
Incidental to this Comment's proposed market-based approach
to medical tourism, the U.S. health care system may experience
systemic changes which are beneficial to American patients generally.
As the practice grows and possibly expands beyond individuals who
lack adequate insurance,434 medical tourism facilities could create
additional competition for domestic providers. If increased
transparency of foreign providers is achieved, foreign providers likely
will provide a cheaper, more accessible, and comparably safe
alternative to many domestic providers. As domestic providers risk
losing money to foreign providers, this competition could create
incentives for domestic providers to reduce costs and to become more
efficient in order to compete more effectively with medical tourism
facilities for American patients.4 35 It could also encourage domestic
providers to become more transparent so as to provide similar quality
assurances to domestic patients. Thus, these systemic changes may
result in lower-cost, higher-quality, and more transparent care for all
American patients, regardless of whether any individual patient
engages in medical tourism. As one analyst has noted, medical
tourism "has the potential of doing to the U.S. health-care system
what the Japanese auto industry did to American carmakers." 436 If the
medical tourism industry is able to maintain its competitive cost
advantage and high quality care in the face of the recent health
insurance reform, such effects are likely to occur, regardless of how
these reforms eventually influence the domestic health care market.
CONCLUSION
Critics envision the rise of medical tourism as creating a virtual
Scylla and Charybdis for American patients, "forcing [patients] to
choose between domestic care, which may result in financial
devastation, and under-regulated care abroad, which leaves patients
without legal remedy . .. . ." There is some recognizable truth
underlying this assessment, as both medical tourism and the current
U.S. health care system are imperfect sources of health care.
434. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
435. See Horowitz et al., supra note 7; see, e.g., Klaus, supra note 8, at 245-46 ("The
competition posed by [foreign] hospitals could inspire policymakers to develop innovative
strategies for closing the gap between surgery costs in the United States and [abroad]
436. Horowitz et al., supra note 7 (quoting Princeton University health care economist
Uwe Reinhardt in Unmesh Kher, Outsourcing Your Heart, TIME, May 21, 2006, at 44, 44).
437. Brady, supra note 16, at 1111.
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However, this Comment has argued that medical tourism, despite its
inherent flaws, represents a favorable option for patients as compared
to the U.S. health care system.
Medical tourism is not a solution to the various failings in the
American health care market, and this Comment does not advocate
any long-term plan which would impose overseas care on all
underinsured individuals as a substitute for comprehensive health
care and health insurance reform. Such a proposal would, as critics
have suggested, be "irresponsible public policy."438 It is equally
irresponsible, however, to ignore the uncertain state of the American
health care system as it currently exists, or the fact that medical
tourism may represent the only means for some American patients to
obtain the medical treatment they desire. Broad regulation of medical
tourism is unnecessary, ineffective, and potentially harmful to both
individual medical tourists and to patients generally, as it will inhibit
the benefits which medical tourism provides American patients. Until
American patients are assured of the benefits of equitable access to
high-quality health care, medical tourism should remain a viable
option, protected by efforts to promote transparency and otherwise
allowed to thrive under the beneficial influence of the market.
HEATHER T. WILLIAMS
438. See id. at 1112.
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